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In the summer of 1984 the Vereniging voor Openbaar Onderwijs (Society 
for Public Education, an organisation of parents), published a study 
entitled The New School struggle (1). Authors of the book analysed the major 
debates of the last decade concerning education, and concluded that, after a 
50-year period of relative stability in the relationship between private and 
public education, advocates for the private sector again felt the need to 
defend the right to their education, and in this way polarised and paralysed 
each debate on education-policy.
They did not forget to mention that the renewed offensive on the part of the 
confessionals (in the Netherlands, like in most Western European countries, 
private education is nearly always denominational education) provoked 
counter attacks from the other side.(2) Their own study contributed to a 
clarification of the stand taken in various debates by those in favour of 
public education.
The issue of the school controversy occasionally appears on the front 
pages of the national newspapers. Many conflicts between adherents of both 
sectors, however, never reach the national newspapers. Most of the conflicts 
involved in the new school struggle take place at the local level, where 
both sides try to maintain control over their elementary schools.
Hence we find that on the one hand those involved in education policy making 
note a revival of the school struggle, while on the other hand the question 
of the relation between private and public education has a relatively low 
profile in the general political debate.
The situation is very different in France where in the spring of 1984 
the debate on the 'ecole privee' developed from a political issue involving 
only those in the peak organisations of both the private and the public 
sector, into an acute political conflict in which those directly involved in 
private education (parents, teachers) in particular, protested en masse 
against the government proposal aiming at a stronger integration of the 
private and the public sector.
Whereas in France we can speak of "la guerre scolaire", in the 
Netherlands we speak only of a silent school struggle.
How can we explain the fact that the conflict takes such a different 
form in the Netherlands, compared with France?
Among other factors, the present position of the private sector certainly is 




























































































In the Netherlands the private sector has a much stronger position 
than it has in France. This is for exampLe made clear by the fact that 
denominational schools accounted for 64.6% of the pupils in elementary 
education in 1980 (the figure had been over 70 in the nineteen fifties and 
nineteen sixties), while in France only about 16% (1984) of the children 
attended private schools.
Another sign of the strong position of the private sector is that 
private education has been fully financed by the state for a long time 
(since 1917), while in France this has been the case only since 1959. The 
system of financing is also much better administratively secured. Moreover 
the principle of full financial compensation for private education has 
equally long been supported by all major political parties. From the moment 
the principle was introduced it has never been contested.
Most important of all, however, is the position of private 
denominational education in the overall social structure.(3)
In France the debate about private versus public education cuts right across 
the major social cleavage, the division between right and left. At the 
political and social level French Catholics have never been organised on the 
basis of their being-catholic.
The position of denominational education in the Netherlands though is 
a very different. Here the dividing lines in the education sector, between 
public and private education in the first place and between Catholic and 
Protestant education in the second place, run parallel to the dividing lines 
in many other spheres. Organisation along religious dividing lines was from 
the beginning of this century the most conspicuous feature of Dutch society, 
not only because the Confessionals attained such a strong position, and 
because the division was so rigid, but also because this segmentation 
affected nearly all spheres of social life. The process resulting in this 
specific mode of social organisation was called verzuiling.
Contrary to the French situation there was nothing strange about the 
existence of a private, denominational, education sector next tc the public 
sector. Characteristic of the way social life was organised in the 
Netherlands was that private (confessional) organisations held the right to 
provide as much as possible for the needs of their own group, receiving 
financial assistance by the state. In fact, in the course of the century, 
with the increase of verzuiling, many executive tasks of the government were 
relegated to private bodies who were then entitled to full financial 
compensation by the state in accomplishing these tasks.
Taking this into consideration it does not seem very likely that the 
(material) right to private education to exist will be denied by anyone. The 
lack of a serious threat to private education can partly explain why the 
school issue does not arouse so many emotions among the public as it does in 
France.
In this paper I will concentrate on the way private education is 




























































































called verzuiling, because this seems to be one of the main factors peculiar 
to the Dutch education system.
Considerable attention will therefore be paid to the development of the 
verzuiling phenomenon in general.
The chapters of which this paper consists are written as a historical and 
sociological background to my current research on verzuiling of the 
education system. Hence they neither contain results of own research, as 
this has not been finished yet, nor do they include a kind of research- 
design. Their main purpose is to review the literature on verzuiling and in 
particular on verzuiling of the education system, to develop an insight in 
the historical and social factors that played a part in the development of 
the education system, and that may be useful to interprete the results of my 
own analysis.
I start in chapter one with a discussion of the concept of 
verzuiling, trying to remove the theoretical confusion surrounding the 
concept.
In chapter two I examine the political situation preceding the 
development of verzuiling. Although verzuiling originates in the last decade 
of the 19th century some of its origins are to be found in the historic 
processes of nation building, mass mobilisation and the formation of mass 
political parteis in the second half of the last century. The school 
controversy played an important part in this period, and will be dealt with 
extensively in this paper.
In chapter three I discuss how the verzuiling slowly penetrated all 
sectors of Dutch society. The verzuiling did not only bring together groups 
of people in highly segregated sub-cultural organisational blocks and social 
environments, but also provided an important structure through which 
governmental tasks were increasingly put into effect. One of the clearest 
examples of both aspects of the verzuiling process could be found in the 
school system.
Secondly I will examine the process of ontzuiling (de-pillarization, 
Entsaulung). Although the 1950's saw the first strong opposition to the 
structure of verzuiling, the reverse tendency only gained momentum in the 
nineteen-sixties. At this point we have to pose such questions as: why did 
the ontzuiling process become dominant in precisely this period? Which 
factors gave rise to it? Did it affect all sectors of society and if so, did 
it affect them at the same rate? To what extent did the ontzuiling process 
influence the school system, and how did the verzuilde organisations in the 
education field, both at the local level and the national level, react to 
this?





























































































1) F. van Schoten and H. Wansink, De nieuwe schoolstrijd; Knelpunten en 
conflicten in de hedendaagse onderwijspolitiek, Utrecht/Antwerpen, 1984.
2) The term Confessionals is used to refer to all people belonging to a 
church.
3) I use the terms denominational education and denominational schools to
refer to education/schools with a religious identity. There are two main 
types of denominational schools in the Netherlands: Catholic and
Protestant ones. The latter are not usually attached to a specific strand 
in Protestatism. Only some Orthodox Calvinists, belonging to a 






























































































VERZUILING AS A POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL 
CONCEPT
For a considerable period of time Dutch society was verzuild. This 
is common knowledge not only among Dutch social scientists but also among 
the public at large. The term has become so frequent in common parlance over 
the last thirty years that many scholars take the phenomenon for granted, 
without trying to understand it and without paying attention to its 
development. Verzuiling is considered to be just a feature peculiar to Dutch 
society, the concept referring to the strong vertical segmentation along 
(religious) ideological dividing lines of all sectors of societal life.
Generally the phenomenon is said to have dominated society from 1870 
to 1960. During the greater part of this period, up to about 1950, the 
concept of verzuiling did not exist though. The majority of Dutch people 
lived their lives within verzuilde social and political structures, and did 
not recognize this phenomenon as a social construct. Most of them considered 
it natural to belong to a Catholic trade union or to go to a Protestant 
school. Among intellectuals though, there existed an earlier awareness of 
the fact that the verzuiling was a historical (thus changeable) organisation 
of social and political life, and this awareness became more manifest after 
World War II when some of the Catholic and Orthodox protestant intellectuals 
became member of the newly formed social democratic party. However, the 
academic discussion on the phenomenon that Dutch society was divided into 
strongly from each other segregated groups, started only in the second half 
of the 1950's, probably as a result of the Bishop's Charge of 1954, which 
statedg that Catholics who joined a Socialist labour union risked ex- 
communication .
The debate was initiated by J.P. Kruyt and J.A.A. van Doom in the 
journals De Sociologische Gids and Socialisine en Democratic. (1)
In the first wave of literature on verzuiling the different contribu­
tions often had ideological connotations.(2) Either the author thought 
verzuiling an outdated inefficient and expensive mode of organising social 
functions (3), or the author defended verzuiling as an efficient means of 
integrating individuals into larger social groups, and of integrating these 




























































































objective and less ideological approach to the study of verzuiling came from 
Social Democratic scolars, who found themselves in the contradictory 
position of having to defend verzuiling because of its integrating function, 
and of being at the same time members of the PvdA, the (Social Democratic) 
party that since World War II had tried to abolish the structure of 
verzuiling at the political level, i.e. in the party-system and government. 
From then on scholars have sought to explain rather than to defend or oppose 
verzuiling in ideological terms.
Their first publications showed the strong influence of functionalism 
and structuralism. Verzuiling was defined as a specific structure of 
society, which served the purpose of providing a system of social control. 
The sociologist Van Doom was one of the scholars who took this approach. 
His definition ran as follows:
'Verzuiling was the process in which various ideologically defined 
groups present in sociey, were included in mainly organisational 
social control systems in which tendencies of organisation to outgrow 
ideological values and of ideological justification of organisational 
control were present.'(4)
In the course of the debate on verzuiling several difficulties with this 
definition became apparent.
Firstly, although many authors considered verzuiling to be a highly 
specific social phenomenon, existing only in the Netherlands, this 
specificity did not appear in the definition. The problem lay mainly in the 
term ideological, because by making use of this general term the peculiarity 
of the Dutch situation was overlooked, namely that vertical segmentation had 
taken place along religious dividing-lines. As formulated by Van D o o m , the 
concept of verzuiling could also refer to the formation of a set of 
organisations with a particular socio-economic ideology, or one which was 
based on a nationalistic ideology. Consequently it was theoretically 
impossible to distinguish between zuilen, i.e. population groups formed on 
the basis of common religious ideas, and classes , i.e. population groups 
organised on the basis of a common position in the production process.
A second difficulty arose from the last part of the definition where 
the social control function of the verzuiling was mentioned. This social 
control system was simply said to exist, but Van Doom gave neither an 
indication of the origin of this control system, nor did he specify for 
whose benefit it was created. Who were the people having control in this 
system and which people were being controlled? In other words, who were the 
agents of the verzuiling? According to Van Doom the integrative function of 
the verzuiling explained its existence.
The definitions given by Van Doom and Kruyt (5) were for some time 
the starting point for almost every study on verzuiling. In this first 
period it were mainly sociologists who showed an interest in this area.
A second wave of studies on verzuiling began after 1969. In this year 
Lijphart published his book 'The politics of accomodation'(6) in which he 
posed a connection between the existence of segmented pluralism in the 
Netherlands (7)) and a specific type of parliamentary democracy, what he 




























































































social system was the starting point, the independent variable. The specific 
mode of decision-making at governmental level was the variable that had to 
be explained.
Criticism of Lijphart's theory was two-fold. Firstly his explanation 
of the origin of the consociational democracy was criticised.(8) Secondly 
Lijphart was criticised for taking verzuiling as an a priori. On this point 
his study did not go beyond description. According to his critics he had 
taken verzuiling as a 'natural' feature of Dutch society. They stressed the 
need to look for explanations of the origin of the verzuiling. The latter 
criticism was mainly made by left wing political scientists who started to 
write on the issue of verzuiling only at the end of the 1970's. They argued 
that the verzuiling did not simply arise as the result of a strategy of the 
churches to keep their members completely within their influence (9), or as 
the result of a strategy of the political parties to be sure of their 
electorate (10), but as the unplanned outcome of the conflicts between 
various factions in the elite about the question of how the expanding labour 
force was going to be incorporated in the modern nation-state.
A fundamental difference between the scholars of this group and the 
sociologists of the 1950's was that, where the latter defined verzuiling as 
a social structure, the former understood verzuiling as the temporary 
outcome of a historical process in which several forces opposed each other. 
They were of the opinion that during the entire century tendencies towards 
both verzuiling as well as towards ontzuiling existed. Until about 1960 the 
first tendency in their view was dominant, thereafter ontzuiling tendencies 
became stronger.
This point was most strongly made by Stuurman, who recently published 
an in-depth study on the origin of verzuiling in the Netherlands (11). 
According to him the origin of verzuiling lay in the process of
modernisation of the nation-state. The main problem to be faced in this 
transformation process was the so-called social question, the incorporation 
of the masses into the national state. Basically this problem fell into 
three parts. Firstly, changes in the production process required a
restructuring of the relation between capital and labour. Secondly, the 
relation between the sexes, having its central focus in the family, had to 
be adapted to the rapid socio-eonomic developments. Thirdly, the state had 
to become more democratic to maintain its legitimacy. In the struggle over 
the form these restructuring and modernisation processes were to take there 
were several opposing forces, among these the Confessional elites, who 
ultimately emerged victorious.
In the Netherlands the class struggle was partly waged in an indirect 
way since it was not the ideologies of the Liberal class and the labour 
movement which opposed each other. Instead of this the opposition of the 
labour force to the Liberal class took the form of a conflict between the 
Confessional forces and the anti-Confessional forces. To understand this, 
one must bear in mind that religious divisions had played an important part 
in Dutch society for centuries. Apart from the opposition between Catholics 
and Protestants, differences of interpration had always persisted within the 
Dutch Reformed Church, resulting, during the course of the 19th century, in 




























































































group became one of the major forces contributing to the origin of 
verzuiling. In much the same way as it came to dominate the economic and 
political system, religious ideology influenced the relation between the 
sexes, i.e. public morality, as well.
Hence the churches, the labour movement and the Liberal bourgeoisie 
were the protagonists in the restructuring of socio-economic relations, 
which was necessary because of rapid changes at the economic level. In the 
period 1900-1920 the confessional ideology became firmly established as the 
dominant one. Consequently the formation of organisations (political 
parties, labour unions, schools etc.) took place more and more along 
religious dividing lines. To obtain a precise understanding of this process 
one has to examine the concrete developments at the local, regional and 
national level.
Verzuiling was an overall social process. But how was verzuiling 
linked to the development of the elementary school system?
Two moments of articulation, which will be more fully discussed in 
the next chapter, were clear.
The first moment occurred in the school controversy, which played 
such an important role in the political scene in the second half of the last 
century. In the struggle for full state recognition of independent schools, 
(12) some of the cleavages which by the turn of this century were deeply 
entrenched in Dutch society, developed. It was on precisely this issue that 
the Orthodox Protestants formed the first mass movement and somewhat later 
the first political party. By doing so the first verzuilde organisations 
were created, and this triggered off a process of organisation and counter­
organisation which eventually resulted in a thorough segmentation of the 
whole society. In chapter two, where the developments of this period of 
first mass political events is examined, the question will be raised whether 
this issue was so important to the Orthodox Protestant group that it
provided them with the possibility of organising a mass movement, or whether 
it gained such prominence because it was manipulated by political 
entrepreneurs who saw it as an opportunity to form a modern mass political 
party and sought a solid base to recruit (part of) these masses.
Secondly the concept of verzuiling had to be discussed to understand 
better why the education system formed such an important part of this
specific socio-political structure. We will see not only that the school 
system was the sector of society ( with the political system) in which
verzuiling developed strongest, but also that verzuiling of the school 
system was essential for transmitting the religious ideologies necessary to 
ensure the continued existence of the whole structure.(13) But before
examining the actual historical process of verzuiling we pay attention to 





























































































Notes to Chapter one
1) J.P. Kruyt, Sociologische beschouwingen over de zuilen en verzuiling, 
from: Socialisme en Demokratie, 12 (1957), p. 11-30.
J.J.A. van Doom, Verzuiling, een eigentijds systeem van sociale 
contrôle, from: De Sociologische Gids, Third vol. (1956), p.41-49.
2) J.J. Gielen's 'Pacificatie en de zuilen', Meppel, 1956 is the most 
extreme example of this ideologically charged approach.
3) For example: S. Miedema, De kosten van de verzuiling, from: Socialisme
en Demokratie 12 (1957), p. 47-58.
4) J.J.A. van Doom, 1956, p.42.
5) See note 1).
6) A. Lijphart, The politics of accomodation; pluralism and democracy in 
the Netherlands, Berkely/Los Angeles, 1968.
7) Lijphart used the concept of zuil in an extremely wide sense; it meant 
hardly more than 'population group'. A. Lijphart, 1968, p. 1: 'Deep 
religious and class divisions separate distinct, isolated and self- 
contained population groups.'
8) One of his major critics in the same discipline was R. Steiniger, who 
argued that the origin of the consociational democracy should not be 
sought in elite-behaviour, but in the situation of 'unclarified 
majority' in which the party-system found itself; R. Steiniger, 
Polarisierung und Integration, eine vergleichende Untersuchung der 
strukturellle Versàulung der Gesellschaft in den Niederlanden und in 
Osterreicvh, Meisenheim am Gian, 1975.
9) This argument is put forward by J.M.G. Thurlings in 'De wankele zuil', 
1971.
10) This is Steiniger's central hypothesis. R. Steiniger, 1975.
11) S. Stuurman, Verzuiling, Kapitalisme en Patiarchaat, Nijmegen, 1983.
12) Although I used the term 'private education' in the introduction, since 
this is the term most commonly found in literature on the relationship 
between education provided by the state and education provided by 
private bodies, in casu private bodies with a religious identity, I 
prefer, when speaking about the Netherlands to make use of the term 
independent education. Throughout this papar I will speak of independent 
schools to distinguish between schools founded by private bodies and 
those whose direct authority is in the hands of national or local 
government (the so-called public schools). I prefer the term independent 
school to the term private school because the latter has the connotation 
of being (partly) paid for by private persons/institutions. The feature 
of the Dutch education system is that the direct authority of non-public 
schools falls to private persons while they are fully financed by the 
national government. To stress this particular arrangement the term 
independent education will be used throughout the remaining part of this 
paper.
13) So far I have used the Dutch term of verzuiling and I will continue to
do so throughout this paper. In the relevant literature both
translations into English (pillarization, pillar) as well as 




























































































retain the Dutch terms for three reasons. Firstly the concepts were 
developed in the context of Dutch society. Secondly the structure of 
verzuiling was generally said to be more strongly developed in the 
Netherlands than in any other country. Thirdly, because the Dutch terms 
were to a certain degree already diffused in scientific literature in 
the English language. I will, however, translate all quotations from 
Dutch sources into English, risking possible reduction of meaning and 
authenticity for the sake of readableness.
CHAPTER TWO
NATION-BUILDING, MASS MOBILISATION AND THE 
SCHOOL STRUGGLE IN THE LAST CENTURY
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will focus on the school struggle as it took place 
in the last century, mainly from 1850 onwards, and on the macro-social 
processes in which the school struggle was embedded.
Initiative to the study of phenomena like nation-building and mass 
mobilisation at theoretical level have been given by the 'school' of Stein 
Rokkan. (1) They did some empirical research on Norway as well. Concerning 
the Netherlands however it was Daalder who published some important articles 
on the general processes of opposition formation and verzuiling. (2)
Verzuiling, as a process in which organisation and religious ideology 
became more and more interwoven, did not gain momentum before the last 
decade of the 19th century. Stuurman saw the period 1848-1895 as follows: 
from 1848 until 1870 there were only very few signs of verzuiling, whereas 
the period 1870-1895 saw some tendencies towards verzuiling but only on the 
part of orthodox Protestants. The political party of the Orthodox 
Protestants, the Anti Revolutionaire Partij, was founded in 1879 and even 
prior to this from within these circles a mass movement had risen on the 
issue of independent schools. In the 25 years after 1895 the number of 
organisations increased enormously within all the major sections of the 
population: both the Socialists and the Confessionals extended their 
organisational network, at the political level and in other social domains.
Stuurman refuted the view of many authors that verzuiling resulted 




























































































existence of a deepening conflict between Catholics and Protestants was 
explicitly at the base of the emancipation hypothesis.(3)
In his opinion it was not the sharp division between various 
religious ideologies but the fact that these ideologies appeared useful, 
although in an adapted form, in a period which required a restructuring of 
the sociel structure, which created the verzuiling.
Thus the verzuiling did not originate out of religious cleavages, but 
religious cleavages were used in the social transformations resulting from 
industrialisation, urbanisation and growing mobilization.
Moreover, the notion of deepening ideological/religious cleavages 
during the 19th century presupposed a linearity in the formation of 
oppositions which historically did not exist. On the contrary, in this 
period the dividing lines were fluid, changing with the political issues at 
stake. Once the processes of mass mobilization, mass organisation and the 
formation of mass political parties got under way, the potential oppositions 
were manipulated and used by leaders of political parties and other elites 
to delineate the group from which to recruit their followers.(4)
Only in this period, starting in the Netherlands at about 1890 if we 
leave the developments in Orthodox Protestant circles aside, cleavages 
became fixed, because they now resulted in the creation of organisational 
networks. In this way the major cleavages existing at that time strongly 
influenced the structure of the party system which came into being.
Contrary to the Norwegian case analysed by Rokkan in his 1966-article 
(5), in the Netherlands there were not two distinct waves of mass 
mobilisation (except for the relatively early founding of the ARP), the 
first along cultural/territorial lines and the second along the class- 
division. Here the organisational efforts along religious lines and the 
organisational efforts along class lines were two sides of the same 
issue, which was incorporation of the working class into the modern nation­
state. The result was a particular party system, in which the confessional 
parties played a crucial part, because they attracted a large part of the 
working class voters and held for a long period (1918-1967) a majority 
position in parliament.
Hence it were not always the oppositions which held the population 
most deeply divided that determined the boundary lines of the organisational 
segmentation, but the oppositions which were politically relevant at the 
time organisational networks developed.
In the following sections I will deal in more detail with the various 
potential oppositions which existed in the 19th century. It is important to 
do so since these oppositions were mainly based on different conceptions 
about the character of the modern nation-state. A fundamental issue in the 
formation of the modern Dutch nation was the state-church relation, apart 
from the other issue of the organisation of the working class. The latter 
question did not become urgent before the end of the century, as 
industrialisation only really started at that time. But when it came to the 




























































































relations was most explicitly expressed in the struggle over denominational 
education. When it was recognised in principle that denominational schools 
had a right to state-subsidization the so-called social question gained 
more importance and the focus of attention at the political level shifted 
towards the issues of full suffrage and the organisation of the working 
class. Since the school struggle formed mainly part of the power struggle 
between church and state, I will concentrate on the oppositions which were 
important in that respect, leaving the opposition between Socialist movement 
and bourgeoisie relatively underexposed as this opposition deepened only 
after the school struggle had reached its peak.
2.2. Development of oppositions which were of importance in the nation­
building process (6)
2.2.1. Catholics versus Protestants
The Dutch nation is thought by many to have always been a typically 
Protestant nation. Apart from being untrue historically, it sheds little 
light on the present state of affairs with Catholics constituting one third 
of the Dutch population.
In the 16th century the majority of the population still adhered to 
the Catholic religion. The present boundary between predominantly Protestant 
provinces in the North and the predominantly Catholic southern provinces did 
not exist at that time. Only the conquest of the southern provinces by Spain 
resulted finally in a preponderance of the Catholic church in the South, and 
a dominant position of the Protestant church in the North. This geographical 
distribution was never absolute though.
The role of the Protestants, however, in the war against Spain (waged 
throughout a large part of the 16th and 17th century) eventually led to the 
recognition of the Calvinist Dutch Reformed Church as the official religion 
in each of the seven provinces constituting the Republic. The fact that the 
provinces in which the Catholic population was concentrated was granted the 
status of a semi colony strengthened resentment among catholics.
At the same time the Catholic hierarchy had been dissolved and the 
Vatican regared the Netherlands as a missionary territory until 1908. As 
long as the Republic of the Seven United Provinces existed it was forbidden 
for Catholics to hold their own church services. Therefore the mainstream of 
Catholics isolated themselves in the small local circle of co-religionists, 
where they found refuge against discrimination by other groups. They 
were.generally speaking, very cautious in their contacts with the outside 
world. In particular the Catholics living in the religiously heterogeneous 
areas of the North and the West of the country remained for a long time 
aware of their suppressed position. This discouraged them from political 




























































































But there existed a more pragmatic tendency as well among the 
Catholic population. These people belonged, for the most part, to the 
bourgeois stratum of society. They were in favour of a pragmatic approach to 
the other population groups. Ideologically this group was more oriented 
towards the new liberal-democratic conceptions of society.
In the long run the new secular ideologies gained a stronger 
influence among Catholics than the traditional, orthodox ideas of the 
isolationists. This opened up the way in the 19th century to a strengthening 
of Catholic power by means of an alliance with the liberals.
As a result of the revolutionary events and the founding of the 
Bataafse Republic in 1795, civic equality of all citizens came to be 
officially recognised. It was proclaimed that 'there cannot and will not be 
tolerated a privileged or dominant church in the Netherlands'.(7) The Dutch 
Reformed Church lost its authority with respect to marriage, poor relief and 
education. Its dominance gave way to an explicit acceptance of the principle 
of religious diversity. Catholics, Jews and non Calvinist Protestants were 
no longer formally excluded from administrative functions.
However, social equality of the Catholics was still very far away. To 
improve their position in society many Catholics saw the democratic ideals 
of the Liberals as a solution, just as before 1795 they had turned to the 
Liberal ideology of the Patriots.
In 1848, under the influence of the international revolutionary 
climate, a temporary political crisis developed. But in the Netherlands it 
was clearly too early for a democratic, socialist, development. A serious 
revolutionary threat did not exist there.
Because of the events of 1848 however, the Liberal statesman 
Thorbecke and his followers were able to carry out major constitutional 
reforms, for which they received the support of the Liberal Catholics. 
Taking into account their weak social position and their still weak 
religious position (the Hierarchy was not yet restored) an alliance with the 
Liberals seemed to be the best option for the Catholics at that time. Under 
the new Constitution, churches were free to create their own internal 
organisation and this allowed for the possibility of re-establishing the 
Hierarchy. Apart from this, the constitution guaranteed the right of any 
group in society to organise its own education, and this then seemed the 
best way for the Catholics to defend themselves against the generally 
Protestant character of the existing state-schools.
In 1853 the Catholic Hierarchy was indeed re-established, but this 
did not take place without arousing strong oppostion on the part of 
the Orthodox Protestants and Conservatives, the latter still maintaining a 
strong position in the state-apparatus, despite the Liberal 'victory' of 
1848. But in the years following the Apri1-movement of 1853 (against re­
establishment of the Catholic Hierarchy) the Conservative faction was no 
longer able to retain its strong position, and this meant to the Catholics 
that the gains of 1848 were no longer seriously threatened.
In the light of the weakening power-position of the Conservatives, 




























































































the constitutional reforms of 1848) changed. From being initially a 
protection against the Protestants, the Liberal character of the state 
became increasingly problematic for the Catholics, because it reduced their 
own status to that of a private group in society. A break with the political 
position of the past came in 1868 when the Bishops strongly condemned the 
neutral character of the education provided by the state. Thus they turned 
against the Liberals. From then on there existed a true 'catholic party', 
distinct from the Liberals, and this Catholic party would in the course of 
the school struggle find its new allies: the Orthodox Protestants. In 1888 
both these groups constituted the first coalition-cabinet in Dutch history. 
But the relation between Catholics and Protestants remained uneasy for a 
long time, partly because of anti-catholic sentiments among the Orthodox 
Protestants, partly because of fear on the side of the Catholics of the 
Orthodox Protestants who had so vehemently opposed re-establishment of the 
Hierarchy.
Despite the fact that since 1868 they had had a clear position as 
Catholics in parliament, within Catholic circles there had not been a 
strongly felt need to form a mass political party. One of the reasons for 
the absence of a political or social movement (as we will see the role of 
the Catholics in the school struggle was also relatively restricted) was the 
strong, hierarchical church organisation, which did not permit many 
activities by the lay Catholics, either in church matters or in more secular 
activities.
Another reason was the lack of agreement among the Catholic elite. 
Despite a swing to the protestant side, which was imposed by the church, 
Liberal tendencies continued to exist among the Catholics.
Finally political organisation was not so important to the Catholics 
because they could always be sure of the constituencies in the southern 
provincies which were homogeneously Catholic. Several attempts to form a 
true political party led to nothing because of two obstacles to the 
formation of a Catholic party. On the one hand there was the problem of the 
relation between party and the Episcopate. This was 'solved' for a short 
while when the Archbishop of Utrecht forbade the founding of a Catholic 
political party, following the Papal encyclical letter of 1901. On the other 
hand there was the question of the relation with the Orthodox Protestants. 
Should there be narrow cooperation between the two groupings, or a greater 
distance, even opposition? Because of these and other problems, the first 
Catholic political party was founded only in 1922.
2.2.2 Orthodox and Latitudinarian Protestants
Since the 17th century the Dutch Reformed Church was the dominant 
church, but it never got the status of State Church, comparable with the 
Church of England for example. State and church stood in an uneasy relation 




























































































centuries two different tendencies developed within the Dutch Reformed 
Church.
On the one hand there were the ruling regents for whom public order 
and worldly government were much more important than dogmas. They used the 
Reformed Church as an instrument of power. To do so was possible because 
they controlled nominations, through which they could restrict the influence 
of more orthodox calvinists clergy-men.
On the other hand there was a group of Orthodox Calvinists, who 
disliked the established power position of the church and condemned the fact 
that the regents increasingly held a rationalistic standpoint on religion. 
Stuurman reminded us that this movement had its largest following among the 
lower socio-economic strata, in particular among sections of the rural 
population.
In the Constitution of 1815 the separation of church and state was 
one of the basic juridical principles. But the de-facto situation was still 
different, as for example shown by the Church Order of 1816, stating that 
the government had ultimate control over the organisation of Church Rule. 
This was a victory of the Latitudinarians over the adherents of the Orthodox 
Protestant views. Advancement of Christian virtues, maintenance of order and 
unity, and loyalty to the king and the nation were the contents of their 
enlightened religion.(8) This could not but evoke counter-reactions from the 
traditionalists.
The Reveil (1823) was the first opposition movement. It consisted of 
intellectuals who were against these "enlightened" views on religion and 
Christianity, and against the growing emphasis on reason instead of on 
confession. They wanted a return to a traditional personal orthodox belief.
A second movement was the Afscheiding- (Secession-)movement of 1834. 
Contrary to the Reveil movement their followers were mainly found among 
lower income groups, and this gave the movement a specific cararacter. It 
was not only an expression of resistence of Orthodox Protestants against 
Latitudinarian Protestants but at the same time a protest of powerless lower 
income groups against the powerful bougeoisie.
After 1850 three different strands of orthodoxy developed. The most 
important of those was represented by A. Kuyper, who was opposed to any 
weakening of the dogmas. According to Kuyper it was not the national 
organisation of the Dutch Reformed Church which formed the basis of 
religion but the small congregations of orthodox believers. Eventually in 
1886 following his lead, there was a break with the Dutch Reformed Church 
and a new church, the Gereformeerde kerken, was established in 1892.(9)
At the basis of this secession there was not only a religious 
conflict, but also a different view on the relation between state and 
church. Kuyper neither accepted the Liberal doctrine that religion was a 
private matter, nor did he accept the notion of the state as an instrument 
of the church, nor did he accept government control over religious matters.
In his opinion the Liberal state had to be transformed into a state 
with a positive Christian character through defeat of the neutral forces by 
the Orthodox Calvinists. Only through organisation, which simultaneously 
brought about isolation and outside action, could the state be won. This 




























































































one to be able to mobilize a mass movement, and somewhat later to found the 
first national mass political party, the Anti Revolutionaire Partij (ARP).
The Dutch Reformed Church remained the largest Protestant church but 
experienced increasing internal rivalry between latitudinarian and orthodox 
groups. In the political system this was expressed by the fact that the 
members of this church never, as a whole, supported a confessional party. 
After World War II the Social Democratic party (PvdA) always counted among 
their voters many members of the Dutch Reformed Church.
But Kuyper could not avoid a split within the Orthodox Calvinist 
grouping either, although this took place only at the political level.
First of all some of the Orthodox Protestants organised a number of 
rival leagues to the ARP. The main reason for doing so was their 
dissatisfaction with Kuyper's policy of trying to get as many votes from the 
Catholic side as possible, as expressed in the notion of the anti-thesis 
(the doctrine of the anti-thesis was the ideology behind Kuyper's strategy 
of organised action to defeat the anti-christian forces in society and the 
state). In the background, however, discontent about the dominant position 
of the followers of the Gereformeerde Kerken, compared to the members of the 
Dutch Reformed Church, within the ARP, also played a role.
Secondly the struggle over the extension of the suffrage brought 
about conflicts, not only within the Orthodox Calvinist party as we will see 
later. Kuyper was (at that time) strongly in favour of extension of the 
suffrage. This was not surprising considering the fact that the ARP 
recruited its voters largely from the lower-middle and lower socio-economic 
classes, which were still partly excluded from the elections because of the 
high census. De Savornin Lohman, one of the ARP parliamentarians, was 
strongly opposed to enlargement of the electorate. The fact that of the 25 
parliamentarians who eventually left the ARP 17 belonged to the nobility or 
the patriciate showed that in this conflict a class-element was clearly 
present(lO).
2.2.3. Liberals versus Conservatives
The first liberal tendencies arose in the course of the 18th century. 
Just before abolition of the Republic of the Seven United Provinces (1795) 
there existed a strong democratic opposition (of the so-called Patriots) to 
the increasingly oligarchical rule in the Republic. At first this tendency 
seemed to be strengthened by the developments after the French invasion. But 
after the turn of the century the Democrats lost their position of power and 
conservative forces became dominant again. The new Kingdom, instituted in 
1813, at the end of the French domination, brought about the same 




























































































In 1814 a new constitution was passed, which was again adapted in 
1815 because of the inclusion of Belgium into the kingdom. This new 
constitution included, as has beem mentioned, many principles which had been 
valid in the past. The king held almost absolute power, but this formed at 
least a counter-balance to the particularist oligarchical forces.
The opposition between autocratic rule of the king and the ideal of a 
more democratic state-form was the major issue of conflict between 
Conservatives and Liberals.
A second issue at stake was the relation between state and church. 
The separation of both institutions was indeed formally laid down in the new 
constitution but in practice the two were still intertwined because the 
state kept its final say in the organisation of Church Rule. This state 
regulation of the dominant (Dutch Reformed) church deepened the division 
between (Protestant) Conservatives on the one hand, who supported the idea 
of a Dutch nation with a general Christian character and Liberals on the 
other hand, who wanted the state to be strictly neutral. In their vision of 
a national state there was little room for a dominant (semi-) state church.
Under the influence of the revolutionary events abroad (1848) the 
constitution underwent important changes in a Liberal direction, which 
hitherto had seemed to be impossible. As late as 1844 the king had resisted 
demands by members of the Lower House (among them was Thorbecke, the 
subsequent Liberal Cabinet-leader) for the introduction of fully-fledged 
ministerial responsability and a directly elected Lower House. Refusal to 
make fundamental constitutional changes was possible because the Liberals 
were numerically weak and did not possess an organised mass following, 
neither among the lower class nor among the middle class.
The revolutionary upheavals in France and Germany coincided with a 
period of economic depression in the Netherlands. These two factors created, 
for fear of social unrest, a temporary political crisis, which made the King 
suddenly willing to make major constitutional reforms. (11)
Despite the Liberal character of the new constitution the Liberals 
did not maintain their position of power after 1848. The events of 1853 
brought a continuation of the opposition between Conservatives and Liberals 
to light. Apparently the (Protestant) Conservatives won a victory over the 
Liberals by overthrowing the Thorbecke-regime. But this victory was not a 
lasting one as the Conservatives were not able to offer a real alternative. 
The Conservative 'party' relied on its position of power from the past, and 
it did not formulate a coherent political programme to solve the problems 
which presented themselves in the processes of societal transformations and 
nation-building. Their conception of the nation as a general Protestant 
Christian nation could not be reconciled with the position of the Catholics 
and other, non-protestant denominations, it even met increasing resistance 
by the Orthodox Protestants as well.
The Conservatives also did not understand that, standing on the 
threshold of a period of great social change, which would bring along with 
it the political activation of the masses, it was impossible to undo the 




























































































The events of 1856 surrounding the reformation of the Educational Law 
resulted in the political defeat of the Conservatives. The separation of 
church and state had been succesfully defended (see section 2.3). During the 
period 1848-1857 the Conservatives became more and more isolated. A 
political Conservative party did not come into being. The masses of the 
political centre and right, which in many countries were captured by broad 
Conservative parties, voted in the Netherlands on a large scale for the 
confessional parties. Consequently after the elections of 1871 the
Conservatives rapidly lost importance.
The Liberals, on the contrary, maintained their strong position in 
parliament in this period. Until the end of the century they held a majority 
in the Lower House. After 1917 (upon the introduction of male full-suffrage) 
their (relative) following declined dramatically.(12) However, during this 
period the Liberals did not retain their unity. The social question caused 
the first split in the ranks of the Liberals. A group of progressive 
Liberals came together, demanding greater state-intervention in the 
necessary social reforms.
One of the crucial issues for them was the state's education policy. 
Extension of the suffrage strongly divided the Liberals further, as it did 
all other political groupings. The proposal of a radical Liberal minister 
(1894) split the Liberals into radical, moderate and conservative factions. 
Despite the decling position of the Liberals, according to Stuurman the 
state was dominated by the Liberals until 1900. This domination was rooted 
in three factors:
- the strong Liberal position in the economy and in the state,
- the Liberal orientation of the intelligentsia,
- the electoral system, which worked in favour of the Liberals.
But in the struggle for the votes of the labour-force - reaching its peak 
only after the turn of the century - the Socialists and the Confessional 
bourgeoisie were the main opponents, the latter being the ultimate winners.
2.2.4. The Socialists versus the non-Socialists
The position of the Socialists will be dealt with only briefly since 
they did not play a part in the school struggle as it took place between 
1848 and 1887. The problem was not yet fully solved in 1887 but it had lost 
its urgency, and other problems were taking up more attention. Moreover, 
although the social question was a factor in the school struggle, the 
working class as a political force at the national level hardly participated 
in it. Nonetheless we have to pay some attention to the position of the 
Socialists because they were among the driving forces in initiating the 
verzuiling process, and because they formed an established part of the 
political configuration which existed when the school issue was finally 




























































































Both the restricted suffrage and the late arrival of 
industrialization meant that the Socialists became politically active only 
in the closing decades of the last century. In 1888 the Sociaal 
Democratische Bond (Social Democratic League) succeeded in having one of its 
members elected, Domela Nieuwenhuis who was the first Socialist 
representative in parliament. From the beginning of their political 
activities the Socialists were disunited on the question of strategy. Was it 
best for them to form a front organisation, which would organise the working 
class for direct class struggle, or should they take a more reformist stand, 
channeling their demands through the parliamentary institutions? When a 
congress in 1893 decided to take the revolutionary strategy, a group of 
people left the party, to form a new, Social Democratic party (the Sociaal 
Democratische Arbeiders Partij). New problems arose for this party: to which 
groups was it best for them to direct themselves to recruit voters? Were 
they to take on the role of opposition party or try to get government 
responsability? In case they joined the government, with whom would they 
have formed alliances, the anti-clerical Liberals or the confessional 
parties that attracted so many working-class voters?
Concerning the last mentioned dilemma it is interesting to note that 
already in 1902, in order not to alienate workers still voting for the 
Catholic and Protestant parties, the SDAP stated that it did not oppose in 
principle the granting of subsidies to independent schools.(13) At the same 
time, however, the SDAP did not want to ally itself with the Confessionals, 
because these opposed the public school too much.
The SDAP shared the opinion of the zlberals on the matter of suffrage 
extension. But when the Socialists were offered some positions in a Liberal 
cabinet in 1913, because neither the Confessionals nor the non-confessional 
bourgeois parties held a parliamentary majority, they refused for electoral 
reasons. For a long time opposition from within the party withheld it from 
participation in government. They did however, take part in the Pacification 
of 1913-1918, which settled the disputes on the freedom of education, 





























































































The oppositions and their political consequences discussed in these sections 
can be schematically summarized as follows








(Cath.) - Lib. Cons.- 
(Ort. Pr)






Lib. Cath. - 
Ort. Pr.







Rad. Lib. - Soc.- Cons. Lib. - 
Kuyper Ort. Pr. Cath. -
Lohman Ort. Pr.
character of the cleavage: 
economic (incorporation of the 
working class in the nation-state)
1913
Main sources: H. Daalder, 1981 and S.Stuurman, 1983
+ Per period I give only the principal cleavage, which led to the formation 
of new parties. This is not to say that cleavages of preceding periods no 
longer played a part. On the contrary, characteristic of the first decade of 
this century was the coincidence of three problems that had to be solved: 





























































































The struggle over the type of education provided by the state was a 
struggle between several corporate actors, the state and the churches. As 
such, this struggle was not unique to the Netherlands, since it took place 
in many other Western European countries.(14) The result of this power 
struggle was not identical in those countries, but depended on factors such 
as the relative strength of the factions in the state-building elite, the 
presence or absence of a state-church, the religious homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of a society. Often a side-effect of this struggle was a 
deepening of cultural/ideological cleavages. The outcome of these struggles 
in the form of the emerging national school systems, can be divided into 
three broad types.(15)
In the first type the secular state kept exclusive responsability for 
the school system, and the character of the schools was religiously strictly 
neutral.
The second type could be found in religious homogeneous countries. 
The schools were managed by the state but the dominant church retained part 
of its former influence.
Under the third a large variety of solutions adapted by countries 
which were heterogeneous with regard to religion, were found, ranging from 
state schools of a general religious character to a system in which neutral 
state schools existed besides (state-financed) independent schools.
The system which evolved in the Netherlands fits into the last category. It 
had an extremely low threshold for private initiative to found schools.
In the following notes the political developments resulting in this 
peculiar arrangement will be dealt with. Because of the prior lengthy 
discussion of the political oppositions in the last century I shall be 
brief here, focusing on the chiefer developments concerning the education 
laws.
The period of French domination brought about, in the general 
move towards unification, a national school system, and the first national 
laws on education. The Dutch Reformed Church was then deprived of its 
hegemonial position. State and church became formally separated, and 
education was considered to be a national issue, for which the state was 
made responsible. Education would retain its Christian character, but no 
longer was there room for religious dogmas. Informally however, church 
influence was still very strong. The fact that education at public schools 
was still to have a general Christian (here: Protestant) character, made it 
clear that the position of the Liberal faction was still weak and that the 
Conservative Protestant bourgeoisie was not yet defeated, but on the 
contrary had strengthened its influence again after 1806.
The new arrangement of the school system was obviously against the 
interests of the Orthodox Protestants and the Catholics, but in different 
ways.
The Orthodox Protestants were dissatisfied with it because the 




























































































for a more orthodox public school. More precisely it supported the idea to 
divide public schools according to denomination, hence to create the side by 
side existence of general Protestant, Orthodox Protestant etc. public 
schools. The Catholics, still having an inferior position in society, were 
afraid of education of a "general Christian character" because this would 
most likely turn out to be to their disadvantage. For this reason they were 
in favour of strictly neutral public schools, and freedom of education.
Thus the school struggle focused on two points: 1) the type of public 
education, and 2) the freedom to found schools diferent from the state 
schools.
It was Thorbecke who made a proposal for constitutional changes 
concerning education. In his view the independent, denominational schools 
ought to have had an important position. He wanted to leave the provision of 
education as much as possible to the free forces in society. State 
intervention and thus public state schools should only be complementary to 
what was done by private actors. Despite this conviction however, he had 
already to give in to the Protestant Conservatives (and this indicated the 
temporary character of the Liberal power position in 1848). In the final 
draft of the article on education the phrase was included that the state had 
to provide for sufficient (ubiquitous) public schools. Ironically, it was 
just this provision that was later used by adversaries of the independent 
school to safeguard their right to public education.
It was also stated that the public school should have a neutral 
character. The term neutral was interpreted to imply •free of any church 
doctrine'. It did not mean, in the opinion of the Conservatives, that the 
education given should not be of a general Christian character.
But with these constitutional changes freedom of education was in 
principle attained, and from then onwards private groups ( e.g. the 
churches) were allowed to found their own schools.
The following table shows to what extent this new possibility was 
used in the period before the independent schools became fully financed by 
the state.
Table one : Percentage of children attending public and independent
elementary schools in the Netherlands, 1850-1910 (16)
attending attending



































































































Elaboration of the principles laid down in the Constitution of 1848 
in a Elementary Education Act demanded further specification of the supposed 
neutrality of the public schools. The bill, drawn up by Van Reenen in 1854, 
was Liberal in the sense that it weakened the general Christian character of 
the public school considerably. In fact this implied that public education 
would be in accordance with the Christian principles and morals in which the 
Dutch nation was historically grounded.
Idenburg divided the resistance against this bill into two groups, 
each in turn divided into two sub-groups with their own view on the relation 
between neutral and confessional, state and independent schools (17):
a. The Confessional oriented group
a.l The adherents of public schools with a general Christian character. 
Those were what we have called the Protestant Conservatives in our 
discussion of the political tendencies of this period.
a. 2 Those who wanted public education to have a positive, orthodox
character. This group consisted of Protestants who had expressed their 
discontent with the changes in the Dutch Reformed Church in the Reveil 
and the Afscheiding movements. If an orthodox school turned out to be 
politically not realizable they would opt for a divided public school.
b. The neutral oriented group
b.l The Liberals striving for a truly neutral school. They opposed the idea 
of a divided public school, because this meant the assignment of public 
tasks to private (church-)bodies, which was considered repugnant to 
constitutional law. This criticism was interesting because in the 
resulting arrangement (1917) private bodies were indeed assigned those 
public tasks.
b.2 The second group held a strongly individual conception of belief and 
confession. Van der Bruggen, their representative, was anti-confessional 
in the sense that he supported a neutral public school. Apart from 
the public schools the independent schools should in his view be 
strongly developed.
It may be noticed that Orthodox Protestants are found under both main 
categories in this scheme.
Van Reenen's proposal aroused a lot of protest on the part of the 
Orthodox Protestants, and resulted finally in the overthrow of the cabinet.
A new proposal (1857), put forward by the fore-mentioned Van der 
Bruggen, even reinforced the Liberal principles refusing to envisage any 
church influence in public education. Public education should be strictly 
neutral and religious education should be provided by independent 
denominational schools. This bill was passed though, the Orthodox 
Protestants and the Catholic representatives from the northern provinces 
voted against. The proposal to make partial state-subsidization of 
independent schools possible did not get enough votes though, because the 
Liberals, who still held a majority in the Lower House thought this a 




























































































reason the 1857- Elementary Education Act was only the beginning of a second 
wave in the school struggle.
While the Catholics, since the Bishops' Charge on Education of 1868, no 
longer supported the Liberal standpoint and had switched to the side of the 
Orthodox Protestants, it was only the latter who turned the school struggle 
into the most important political issue of the two decades between 1870 and 
1890. The Liberal education policy of the 1870's evoked the first mass 
organisations, and led to the founding of the first true political party in 
the Netherlands.
Already in 1861 the Vereeniging voor Christelijk Nationaal 
Schoolonderwijs (Society for Christian National School Education) was 
founded, which was transformed into the Anti Schoolwet Verbond ( Anti School 
Law League) in 1872. The Anti Schoolwet Verbond was a national organisation, 
with over 100 local branches soon after 1872. The members were not merely 
passive followers, but were actively involved. Among Orthodox Protestants 
there existed already a certain tradition of local activism, stemming from 
the action undertaken by church members who tried to get more influence on 
church nominations. This had undoubtly heigthened the rapid expansion of the 
Anti Schoolwet Verbond.
In the elections of 1874 the league functioned as a modern political 
party, with a centrally organised nomination and a binding programme.
When the Liberal statesman^Kappeyne presented a proposal for a new 
Education Act, mass agitation on the side of the Orthodox Protestants 
reached a peak. The proposed act was an attempt to improve the quality of 
elementary education, a cause of great importance to the liberals.
The fact that in the second half of the 1860's the Dutch economy, 
after a long period of relative stagnation, returned to a period of growth, 
brought along with it new possibilities for individual social mobility among 
the middle classes, for which, however, a certain level of education was 
required. But the new possibilities for social mobility, stimulated by more 
and improved education, were only open to the middle classes. Hence 
education should be in accordance with social class, in the view of the 
Liberals.
Among the lower class education did not have the same aim of 
increasing social mobility but of preventing people from being reduced to 
even worse poverty. Anyhow, both aims made it necessary to improve 
educational standards. A study by Van Tijn has revealed that in areas which 
could be labelled as progressive (identified with the help of figures on 
demographic changes) expenditure on education by provincial and local 
authorities indeed increased considerably in the period 1862-1905.(18)
The higher qualifications demanded of the public schools in the 
proposed Education act would be required of the independent schools as well, 
but the latter could not count on any financial support from the state. 
Advocates of independent schools pointed out that freedom of education was 
not fully realized as long as they had to bear the financial burden of the 
founding and functioning of these schools themselves. They strongly objected 
to the fact that they contributed to public education by paying taxes while 




























































































De Kok noticed that in the demand for state-subsidization of 
independent schools the social question also played a part: if increasingly 
high quality public education was free, while the independent schools had to 
do without state-support, the lower classes in particular would become more 
and more exposed to the influence of the neutral public schools.(19)
The Orthodox Protestant, organised a massive petition movement 
against the Kappeyne-law. This petition got three times as many signatures 
as the number of voters then enfranchised. But the school campaign did not 
achieve its aims.
A. Kuyper was the driving force behind the organisational activities 
of the Orthodox Protestants. That he was well aware of the importance of 
organisational skills for a social movement was shown by the fact that he 
studied the organisational principles of the British Anti Corn Law League to 
apply them to the Anti Schoolwet Verbond.
More importantly, he realised that, to increase the political impact 
of the Orthodox Protestants, he had to mobilise what he called 'the people 
behind the voters', i.e. the people who were not yet enfranchised. And these 
were numerous among the Orthodox Protestants, as the majority of this group 
belonged to the lower-middle and lower classes. However, mobilisation alone 
was not sufficient to exercise a permanent political influence. To reach 
this Kuyper founded a political party (the ARP, 1879) in the year after the 
agitation surrounding the Liberal Education Act. In doing so, Kuyper 
appeared to be a perfect example of a political entrepreneur who knew how to 
channel the discontent of his potential followers into a lasting political 
force at national level. Indeed the whole process of mobilisation and 
organisation fitted into the ideal-typical translation process: from the 
initial phase of cleavage accentuation ( manifestation of the Orthodox 
Protestants as a distinguishable strand within the Dutch Reformed Church) to 
the last phase of organisational structuring ( the formation of a political 
party, the founding of a new Church), as formulated by Rokkan.(20) The 
creation of these mass organisations was the first expression of a new 
social structure, the verzuiling.
However, mass agitation surrounding the school issue can not be 
explained by referring to organisational factors only. The issue itself had 
to contain some elements which made it likely to arouse such massive action.
Firstly, mass support for the school struggle demonstrated the 
growing value attached to education generally. The Liberals became more 
aware of both the greater possibilities for social mobility resulting from 
education, and of the disciplining effect of more education for children 
from the lower classes. Similarly in Orthodox Protestant circles this 
awareness was growing. Concern about the deprivation of the working class 
and the growing influence of the socialists ideology among these groups, 
increased the demand for more and better education, with its resulting 
'civilising' effects, in the Orthodox Protestant view. As we have seen, this 
notion played an important role in their request for state-subsidization of 
the independent school.
Secondly, the ideological element was relevant. In the political 




























































































Even if proponents of the emancipation hypothesis were wrong in explaining 
verzuiling in terms of collective feelings of inferiority and suppression, 
it was true that the ideology of the Orthodox Protestants as discriminated 
against and suppressed by the Liberals served a purpose. The ideology 
maintained that they held a backward position because of their religion. The 
school controversy was an outstanding opportunity for politics and ideology 
to become intermingled. As a result the school struggle took more and more 
the form of a freedom struggle.(20)
Mass mobilization among Catholics arose only much later. They 
supported the petition-movement, but not very actively, for reasons 
mentioned above. The fact that many of the public schools in the southern 
provinces were de-facto Catholic, most likely contributed to their low level 
of activity. Any initiatives concerning the school campaign were in the 
hands of church leaders, not of its lay church members.
The support of the Catholics was important however, because the 
cooperation of Catholics and Orthodox Protestants against the Liberals 
reinforced Kuyper's doctrine of the anti-thesis, in which the non 
Confessional forces were opposed to the Confessional ones. This only made it 
easier, when Catholics and Orthodox Calvinists obtained a majority in 
parliament after an extension of the suffrage, to form the first coalition 
cabinet in the Netherlands. This cabinet revised the Elementary Education 
Act of 1857, making it possible for independent schools to get a third of 
their costs paid by local goverments, if they met the legal requirements. 
Hence the law of 1889 began the transformation of the formal right to 
freedom of education into a material one.
The next step in this direction was taken in 1905 when subsidies by 
the national government for independent schools were raised. Considerable 
differences however, existed between regions and localities. Concerning the 
period 1860-1875 the provinces North and South Holland had an above average 
figure for attendance at public schools and this coincided with higher than 
national average expenditures. On the contrary Limburg and North Brabant had 
a more than average share of children attending independent schools.(22) In 
the period 1895-1914 the situation had changed somewhat. The public school 
had a relatively strong position in the provinces Groningen, Friesland, 
Overijsel, Drenthe and Zeeland. In Utrecht, South Holland, North Brabant and 
Limburg the share of public education was less than average.(23)
The school struggle was only really solved in the period 1913-1917. 
The Liberal cabinet which took office in 1913 was very eager to carry 
through electoral reforms. The only way to do so seemed to arrange for an 
exchange: the left's consent to state-subsidization of independent schools 
could be traded off against the right's consent to electoral reforms. To 
this end two commissions were formed in which all political parties were 
represented, to draw up proposals on both issues. By relating the two 
problems it was possible to find a solution.(24) Finally in 1917 parliament 
unanimously passed the two bills. From then on independent schools would 





























































































The compromise reached, known as the Pacification, introduced to 
Dutch politics the important principle of proportionality. The principle 
implied in this case that state-aid was given to education on the basis of 
proportional treatment of all schools, and that representation in future 
parliaments would take place according to the proportion of the votes 
received by each party.(25)
The principle of proportionality functioned as an important device for the 
allocation of money and authority in a plural society, and as such it con­
tributed enormously to the further development of verzuiling. It is to this 
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VERZUILING AND ONTZUILING TENDENCIES 
WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION GIVEN TO THE SCHOOL SYSTEM
3.1 Introduction
In the present chapter I will examine more deeply the importance of 
verzuiling of Dutch society during the present century. As will be 
demonstrated it is not true that the verzuiling reached its peak in the 
1920's and subsequently remained stable until the raid-1960's when suddenly 
the reverse process set in, which we will call ont-zuiling.
When we examine quantitative data on verzuiling we will see that in 
most of the social sectors the phenomenon was still on the increase 
throughout the period 1920-1960, although periods of relative stagnation 
also occurred. Moreover at the end of this period there was no sudden 
reversal from verzuiling to ontzuiling. Ontzuiling processes had already 
started long before. For example, the churches experienced a set-back in the 
thirties and the political system showed the first cracks immediately after 
World War II. But for some time these developments were not strong enough to 
offset the dominant verzuiling tendency. Either they were suppressed again 
soon after their appearance or their occurence remained restricted to a 
relatively small group of people. After 1960, however, a trend towards 
ontzuiling became unmistakeble, and the events of the years 1965-1967 marked 
an acceleration of the ontzuiling process, making it one of the most 
prominent, and most discussed features of Dutch society in the past fifteen 
years.
In this chapter tendencies towards verzuiling and ontzuiling in the 
social structure will be discussed, to provide a background against which to 
present developments in the elementary school system in the present century. 
The chapter will consist of three parts. Firstly I will focus on the growing 
influence of the verzuiling in society. Secondly the ontzuiling process will 
be discussed and in the last part the development of the school system will 
be central. In this last part I will present a first analysis of the 
verzuiling of the school system at the provincial level made by Knippenberg 




























































































3.2. The importance of verzuiling
In chapter one verzuiling was defined as the unforeseen and unplanned 
outcome of the struggles between various factions of the elite, Socialists 
and bourgeoisie, Confessionals and non Confessionals, Catholics and Orthodox 
Protestants, concerning the shaping of the modern nation state. The result 
of this struggle became clear in the years between 1900 and 1920. From then 
on the most Dutch people lived and worked largely within the context of 
confessional organisations and among people adhering to the same religious 
ideology.
The rest of the population likewise lived in isolation. As they did 
not want to participate in confessional organisations they were 'forced' to 
join either organisations of an outspoken Socialists character, or neutral 
organisations addressing a wider public. Since the Liberals did not really 
develop an organistional network, people considering themselves as belonging 
to this group either participated in neutral organisations, or did not join 
organisations at all.
The extent to which the verzuiling as an organisational structure 
penetrated society, measured with the help of various indicators, was 
generally considered to be high. The Netherlands was thought to be a unique 
case of verzuiling. When Dutch scholars started to look elsewhere for 
similar phenomena, and to make their own research on verzuiling more widely 
known, it became possible to look at the verzuiling from a comparative 
perspective.
Lorwin studied the degree of segmented pluralism in a group of 
Western European countries (since at the root of this segmented pluralism 
was 'Weltanschauung' rather than religion we cannot equate his concept with 
the concept of verzuiling). Not only did the Netherlands belong to the group 
of countries with a high degree of segmented pluralism, it was also the only 
country of mixed religion in this group. In Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg 
the Catholics reached a high degree of organisational activity, but in 
these countries the Catholic organisations existed beside Liberal and 
Socialist organisations.(2) Comparison within this group of five spheres of 
activity in the 1950-1960 period showed that the Netherlands was indeed a 
country of strong segmented pluralism, and Belgium was the only one to 
surpass it in this respect.(3)
But let us return to the origin of the verzuiling process in the 
Netherlands.
In the restructuring process taking place in the 1870-1920 period 
religious ideologies played a crucial role. These referred to an ideal 
social order, and included elements concerning both morality and the 
relation between capital and labour. Of course the religious ideologies had 
to be adapted, but ultimately they became the dominant ideology of the newly 
transformed society. This was expressed in the greater organisational 
strength of the Confessionals.
Following this line of thought it is not surprising that Stuurman in 




























































































confessional working class organisations and the development of the party- 
system.
Crucial to the success of the elite-factions favouring confessional 
working class organisations was the period 1903-1914 when these 
organisations made considerable progress, and the socialist unions lost 
their strong ascendancy which had survived till 1903. The failure of the 
great strikes of 1903 marked a reversal of the balance of power. During 
these events the confessional organisations were able to strengthen their 
foothold, and they were able to maintain their position until the 1960's. In 
the period 1910-1920 membership of the labour-unions increased considerably, 
but at a much faster rate for Catholic and Protestant unions than for the 
Socialist ones.
For a long period the share of the work force organised in 
confessional trade unions oscillated between 40 and 50%. Perhaps this was 
not a high percentage of verzuiling compared to other social sectors, but 
considering the fact that it concerned organisations defending the interests 
of a population group which cuts right across both zuilen, it was quite 
high. Only in 1955 did the share cross the 50%-line, not long before 
ontzuiling tendencies became apparent.
Table one. Number of workers organised in confessional trade unions as
share of the total number of workers organised, 1910-1965 (4)
1910 29% 1946 40%
1920 41% 1950 45%
1925 41% 1955 53%
1930 42% 1960 55%
1935 46% 1965 34%
1940 46%
At the political level, as we have seen in chapter two, the party 
system had developed by taking up newly enfranchised voters. This had 
resulted in a set of political parties, each aiming to recruit voters from a 
specific ideologically or economically defined sector of the population, in 
the period 1900-1970 the system became fully established and as it then 




























































































Table two. Number of seats in the Lower House 1918-1963(5)
lib. cath. ARP CHU SDAP/PvdA others total
1918 15 30 13 7 22 13 100
1922 15 32 16 11 22 13 100
1948 8 32 13 9 27 11 100
1952 9 30 12 9 30 10 100
1956 9 33 10 8 34 6 100
1959 19 49 14 12 48 8 150
1963 16 50 13 13 43 15 150
From the developments in the socio-economic and political realms it 
can be concluded that the verzuiling was firmly established by 1920. The 
same was true for the school system. By 1920 some 45% of the children of the 
appropriate age-group attended independent, denominational schools and the 
Education Act of 1920, elaborating the principles of financial equality of 
public and independent schools laid down in the constitution of 1917 caused 
their share to grow even faster after that date.
Table three. Percentage of children attending public and independent 
elementary schools in the period from 1910 to 1960 (6)
1910
attending public schools 
62







Verzuiling developed earliest in the education system, to be followed 
somewhat later by the build-up of confessional parties and labour unions. 
Several authors mentioned the press as another sector that became divided 
along (religious) ideological lines.(7)
Once the verzuiling became entrenched in the party system, the socio­
economic organisations and the school system, it gained a momentum of its 
own.
The segmentation along religious lines which subsequently took place 




























































































that contributed to the origin of the phenomenon. The verzuiling developed 
its own logic, not reducable to the conscious strategy of one agent or group 
of agents. When the principles of segregation and isolation had become 
dominant in certain spheres of activity it was natural to pursue them in 
other sectors as well, whether or not the activity itself had an inherent 
connection with the confessional ideology. For example, if one sent one's 
children to a Catholic school because they were taught the Catholic dogmas 
and educated according to Catholic values, it seemed to be natural to let 
them join a youth organisation of Catholic denomination as well. And from 
there it was only a short step to the Catholic soccer-club.
Even if verzuiling arose from the partly coordinated strategies of 
social, political and religious elites to restructure social relations it 
should not be overlooked that the churches developed an autonomous interest 
in it once it existed. The segmentation of social activities along religious 
dividing lines provided the churches with an effective means to control 
their members. Segregation of the own group from the rest of society had two 
consequences, both of which strengthened the hold of the churches over their 
followers.
Firstly , segregation of their own group from the others implied that 
the socialization of its members remained in the hands of the 'right' 
people. Socialization should be taken here in the widest sense, meaning all 
mechanisms to pass on the values, norms, attitudes and behaviour considered 
to be appropriate to other individuals or sub-groups.
Secondly, segregation meant isolation from other groups and in this 
way contact with people or behaviour deviating from what it should be 
according to the standards developed in the own group, could be avoided. 
Both consequences often made it unnecessary to enforce verzuiling from 
above. When confessional organisations were founded, people joined them not 
because they were forced to do so, but as a result of the way the ideology 
of verzuiling functioned itself.
As already indicated above, the various spheres of activity did not 
have the same relevance for the continuation of the verzuiling. Some played 
a more important part in dispersing and strengthening the religious ideology 
than others, depending on the extent to which their secular function lent 
itself to this.
Thurlings expressed this schematicaly by a series of concentric 
circles, from the centre to the outside representing organisations in 
sectors of declining importance concerning the transmission of ideology 
within the zuilen. (8) His hypothesis was that the activities having a more 
inner position were the first ones to become verzuild. To prove this he 
pointed to the fact that the educational system showed quite early signs of 
verzuiling. Another hypothesis concerning the differences between spheres of 
activity is that those which are most centrally located in the diagram will 
experience a stronger verzuiling than those at the outside. This idea is in 




































































































Figure one. Spheres of activity of declining importance in transmitting 
the religious ideology.
The education system performs a crucial role in this organisational 
structure as it is the chief socialising institution, apart from the private 
institution of the family.
Apart from providing children with cognitive knowledge and skills, 
educational systems are at the same time used to transmit 
cultural/ideological values from generation to generation and as such they 
are major stabilizing factors in societies. If we keep this in mind it is 
immediately clear why it is of such great relevance for various 
groups/institutions to have control over the school system. The longer the 
period children spend at school, and the more functions the school performs, 
the greater the influence of the controlling institution.
This explains largely why in the past, before national education 
systems were formed, churches showed an interest in performing educational 
tasks and why the struggle between state and church focused so strongly on 
education. When the modern nation state developed it needed a national 
unitary education system, not controlled by a (semi-)state church or 
a rival religious group. Such a unitary education system was to serve as a 
central nation-building institution. As we have seen in chapter two the 
churches did not easily give up their hold on education.
However, in every Western European country the growing influence of 
the state on the elementary school system diminished the differences between 
schools with respect to the curriculum, that is, the cognitive knowledge and 
skills that were taught. When diversity in the school system continued to 
exist the wish of groups with ideologies different from the dominant one to 
transmit their own values, has been an important factor causing this 
variety.
Verzuiling did not occur only at the organisational level which was 
usually attributed a central position in verzuiling studies. It was more 
than mere participating in a specific group of organisations based on a 




























































































way of life as well. We can not say that the ideology by definition preceded 
the organisational activities or vice versa.-Both elements were two sides of 
the same coin, and for a long time they mutually reinforced each other. 
Until now empirical research by sociologists has not paid much attention to 
ideological processes, and to questions regarding the elements of the 
verzuiling ideology, the forces which contribute to its formulation and the 
way the ideology of verzuiling functions at individual level. Stuurinan's 
study is the only possible exception.
Not surprisingly most scholars dealt with the structural 
(organisational) aspects of the verzuiling, since this phenomenon had an 
overwhelming influence on the structuring of political and social life in 
the Netherlands. Moreover, the structural characteristic was the more 
tangible (hence more easy measurable) aspect of the verzuiling.
Kruyt and Goddijn were the first to develop instruments to give the 
discussion on structural verzuiling a quantitative base. They developed some 
indices which made it possible to compare the degree of verzuiling between 
sectors or for the same sector in different countries. (9)
The first index they developed was the 'degree of organisational 
verzuiling'. This was the share of the total number of organisations in a 
particular sector which was verzuild ( = based on a religious ideology). 
Hence it expressed the relation between organisations which were verzuild 
and organisations which were not.
Table four. Share of the confessional organisations in seven spheres of 
activity, 1956 (10)
catholic protestant
social work 23.4 32.3
education 35.8 43.2
youth organisations 20.5 49.6
sports 17.2 7.1
health care 14.6 26.2
cultural organisations 23.9 11.9
labour unions 20.0 17.7
The organisational verzuiling was somewhat stronger in protestant 
circles than among catholics. The notion of the concentric circles was 
clearly illustrated: organisational verzuiling was highest in the sectors of 
education, social work and youth organisations, in which the socialising 
aspect played such an important part.
Kruyt and Goddijn gave a second table on the organisational 
verzuiling for the 1914-1956 period, this time adding all spheres of 




























































































Table five. Organisational verzuiling concerning eight spheres of activity 







This table demonstrates that at no point in time did the majority of 
the national organisations belong to the zuilen. The majority was either of 
a general character or based on an ideology different to the Catholic and 
Protestant ones. The Protestant zuil was somewhat stronger than the Catholic 
one during this period but the Catholics continuously increased their share, 
experiencing the fastest growth in the 1925-1932 period.
A second index of verzuiling was the density 
index ('vullingsgraad')(12). Kruyt and Goddijn understood by this the 
percentage of people of a certain denomination engaged in a certain 
activity, which joined an organisation in this sphere of activity that was 
based on their confessional ideology (13).





























































































Table six. Density index in various spheres of activity(14)
Relative figures on 
choice for a confessional Catholic Orthodox Dutch Reformed
organisation/institution calvinists
(15)
1) Parental choice of 90 % 90 %
elementary school (1957) 
2) Participation in 95 % 90 %
farmers organisations 
(1953)
3) Participation in labour 90 % 90 %
union (1953)
4) Lower House election 84.3 % 95 % 32 %
(1959)
5) Reading daily newspapers 79 % 58 % 9 %
(1955)




71 % 73 % 36 %
confessional 
organi sations 77 % 80 % 43 %
Among Catholics as >well as among Orthodox Calvinists loyalty to
organisations and institutions of their respective denomination was still 
very high during the 1950's, the Catholics being slightly more attached to 
their own newspapers, while the Orthodox Calvinists voted very strongly for 
their own parties.
Members of the Dutch Reformed Church, however, tended less to join 
their own organisations (in fact they had less of such organisations. The 
Dutch Reformed Church scored much lower with regard to the degree of 
organisational verzuiling than the other two denominations) (16).
With the help of the density index we are also better able to 
understand the verzuiling in the party system. In table two it has been 
shown that the share each party held remained more or less constant 
throughout a large part of this century. However, we have not yet focused 
attention on the relation between party following and the share of the 
voters belonging to a particular church. Andeweg made an attempt in this 
direction with his Index of Political Orthodoxy, which is equivalent to the 
density-index.(17) To avoid difficulties caused by the existence of several 
Protestant strands Andeweg combined all Protestant voters on the one hand, 




























































































Table seven. Political Orthodoxy index by denomination, 1948-1963 (18)











+) Based on KVP vote; in 1948 andl952 KVP and KNP 
++)Protestant = Dutch Reformed + several Reformed 




Figures for both groups are somewhat on the decline in this period, but 
still considerable. In particular figures for the Catholics are higher than 
that for Catholics in any other country for which these indices have been 
calculated.(19) Figures for the Protestant group are much lower because of 
the Latitudinarian Dutch Reformed voters (20).
Orthodox Dutch Reformed voters cast their votes overwhelmingly for 
the Orthodox Protestant parties (ARP+CHU). Latitudinarian Dutch Reformed 
voters however, more often choose non-confessional parties (PvdA+ VVD). The 
majority of the Orthodox Calvinist voters preferred Orthodox Protestant 
parties (even among the group of non-regular church attenders 63% choose the 
ARP).
A third index Kruyt and Goddijn used to map the phenomenon of 
verzuiling quantitatively is the relation between the quotum that is 
verzuild and the general quotum. The first quotum presented the share of the 
organised individuals which participated in (joined, cast their votes for) 
verzuilde organisations/institutions/parties. Together, the quota add up to 
100%, as the unorganised are not included.(21)
In table one, where the quotum that was verzuild in the labour union- 
sector, and table three, where both quota for the attandance of elementary 
schools were given, this index was already applied.
3.3 The period of ontzuiling
The first signs of ontzuiling could be noticed in the 1920's when the 
social and economic crisis caused an acceleration of secularization in 
several regions. Before that date secularization had been increasing only 




























































































became defined as a serious problem by the churches and it got the attention 
of scholars as well.
In this period, however, increasing secularization did not yet find 
expression in a decine in the structural verzuiling. On the contrary, the 
network of verzuilde organisations continued to become more dense. This was 
illustrated in table 5 of the present chapter. We could say that in this 
period both tendencies, towards verzuiling and towards ontzuiling, were at 
work. But the latter one was still too weak to influence the social 
structure, its occurrence was apparently too fragmented and scattered.
The war years created a new situation which caused the verzuiling to 
be discredited. In the resistance movement opposition against a return to 
the social and economic order of the pre-war years was growing and as soon 
as the war had ended an attempt to restructure the political and socio­
economic relations was made. In the first place the Eenheids Vak 
Centrale(Unitary Trade Union Federation) was founded in 1945. Although it 
was not explicitly created to break through the verzuiling of the organised 
labour movement, and was from the beginning communist-influenced, for some 
time it formed a real threat in particular to the catholic trade union 
federation.
Because the Catholic elite in the southern, already liberated part of 
the country had not yet reestablished its position and the infrastructure of 
Catholic organisations, many Catholic labourers joined the EVC, which saw a 
sharp increase in its membership in 1945-1946. But in the years following 
the EVC was increasingly isolated, because of its communist ideology, but 
most likely also because of competition for members with the traditional 
trade union federations.
Of greater importance were changes at the political level. The post 
war developments had been preceded by an event in 1939. In this year the 
Social Democrats joined the government for the first time in their history. 
By this act the SDAP renounced its isolation, and became an eligible partner 
in subsequent cabinet-formations.
According to Steiniger the main consequence of this sudden change was 
that the SDAP gave up its former strategy, and tried to obtain more votes by 
accepting government-responsability rather than by retaining its dogmatic 
rigidity. During the war years the idea was developed to abolish the old 
party system and to create a new centre-party, in which people belonging to 
different denominations and Socialists would cooperate on the basis of a new 
ideology of personalistic socialism. But as early as 1944 the Bishops in the 
liberated part of the Netherlands declared that as soon as possible the 
Catholic organisations should be reestablished. Thus a complete renewal of 
thè party system was suppressed. But minor changes occurred. The new Social 
Democratic party, the Partij van de Arbeid, continued its new policy after 
the war. It was no longer founded on an ideology, but on a political 
programme. This opened the party to confessional voters, which meant a real 
threat to the confessional parties. In fact it formed a direct attack on the 
verzuiling of the party system. Likewise the Catholic party, the KVP, 
presented itself as a programme party, but this trend was soon reversed, 




























































































Thus the major gains of the years immediately after World War II were 
on the one hand a departure from the system in which parties recruited 
voters more on identification than on the political matter itself. On the 
other hand the new attitude of the Social Democrats made possible the 
establishment of a long lasting cooperation between the five largest 
political parties at government-level. Lijphart defined this cooperation as 
a new type of democratic government, the consociational democracy.(22)
The rest of the political system remained as it was. In the first post 
war election political positions were reestablished, each party obtaining 
more or less the same share of the votes as before the war. All major 
parties were able to maintain their share until the mid-sixties when they 
were suddenly confronted by a sharp decline of their following and the 
advance of some new smaller parties, which are best labelled as anti­
establishment parties. The share of the three confessional parties in 
particular showed a dramatic decrease. In 1966 they no longer got the 
majority of the votes, the first time this had happened since 1917.
Table eight. Results of parliamentary elections, 1963- 1977 (23)
Party 1963 1967 1971 1972 1977
ARP 8.7 9.9 8.6 8.8 _
CHU 8.6 8.1 6.3 4.8 -
KVP 31.9 26.5 21.9 17.7 -
Total CDA 49.2 44.5 36.8 31 .3 31.9
PvdA 28.0 23.5 24.7 27.3 33.8
VVD 10.3 10.7 10.4 14.4 17.9
Total
traditional
parties 87.5 78.7 71.9 73.0 83.6
Total
other
parties 12.5 21.3 28.1 27.1 16.4
Andeweg has tried to explain these sudden changes in party preference 
by testing a series of hypotheses, which tried to relate the changes in 
voting behaviour to (changes in) the religious characteristics of the 
electorate, with post industrial change, with the rejuvenation of the 
electorate, and with the political and social events of the 1965-1967 
period. For none of his hypotheses, however, did he find convincing 




























































































His general conclusion was that losses by the religious parties were related 
to an erosion of orthodoxy rather than church defection on a large 
scale.(24)
In looking for causes to explain the deterioratring strength of the 
religious parties Andeweg made a useful distinction between different 
processes which might have contributed to it and which throughout the 
literature were loosely labelled as depillarization, deconfessionalization, 
secularization etc.
To clarify the confusion about the definitions of these concepts he 
made a schematic presentation of their relations.(25)
In my opinion this diagram lends itself to a more extensive 
application as to explanation of the processes resulting in the decline of 
confessional voting. Likewise it seemed valuable in explaining the general 
decrease in support for confessional organisations/institutions. For this 
reason I altered it slightly, substituting the outcome 'electoral losses of 
religious political parties' for 'declining support for confessional 
organisations.'
Figure two. Putative causes of the declining support for confessional 
organisations
religious denomination
decline in size deconfessioniization
declining support for confes­
sional organisations
After: Andeweg, 1981, p.41.
Secularization means here church defection, i.e. the decision to 
no longer consider oneself a Catholic or a Protestant. Deconfessionalization 
indicated a decrease in loyalty to the religious parties on the part of 
voters who continued to consider themselves Catholics or Protestants, that 
is, while they retained a religious identification they no longer translated 
this into a decision to vote for a religious party. Thus defined, 




























































































attachment or religious orthodoxy, and a weakening of the relation between 
persisting confessional attachment and a vote for one of the confessional 
parties (or in my schema: the membership of a confessional organisation). 
The latter is called depillarization.
Before turning to a discussion of the factors which may have caused 
these mechanisms to work, attention will be given to other ontzuiling 
phenomena. (I use the Dutch term ontzuiling here to describe in general the 
declining support for confessional organisations, by whatever mechanism this 
may be caused - secularization, decline in orthodoxy or depillarization.)
At the political level the decline in the number of votes for the 
confessional parties seemed irreversible. This induced them to merge in 
1977. The new Christian Democratic party (CDA) succeeded in bringing the 
decline of the number of confessional votes to a halt in the first election 
after its founding. Still its very existence can be considered as an 
expression of ongoing ontzuiling. As Steiniger commented, the new party 
could no longer recruit its voters on the basis of a religious principle. 
This principle had now to be transformed into a concrete political 
programme.(26)
In other sectors too ontzuiling tendencies were present. For the 
labour union federations an important event was the abolition of the 
prohibition by the Bishops to join a Socialist labour union in the beginning 
of the 1960's. This paved the way for a federation between the Socialists 
and the Catholic national labour organisations. The Protestant labour unions 
preferred to continue their activities as separate organisations.
In the sphere of the press the structural ontzuiling started 
relatively early, but other factors apart from a decline in orthodoxy or 
depillarization here played a part as well. Particularly in this sector the 
need was felt to carry through rationalizations and expansions, in order to 
remain competitive. As a consequence of fusions taking place in this sector, 
the ideological character of one of the fusing partner organisations was 
often lost (usually the confessional one).
For the non profit sector (social work, health care, youth 
organisations etc.) Van Wersch found a varied pattern of organisational 
ontzuiling (leaving the educational system aside for the moment). In 
clinical healthcare the structural ontzuiling was still weak. In the sphere 
of institutions for family-help on the contrary a strong ontzuiling could be 
noticed between 1968 and 1977.(27) Although data for other types of 
institutions in the healthcare and welfare work-sector were sparse the 
overall impression was that a strong ontzuiling tendency was present.
Van Wersch continued his analysis by breaking down the concept of 
verzuiling down into two sub-concepts: the structural verzuiling and what he 
called, the verzuiling preference. The latter was defined as the extent to 
which individuals or groups value the confessional foundation of the 
institutions which services they used or in which they were employed. The 
same distinction could of course be made for the ontzuiling. Van Wersch 




























































































decline of the verzuiling preference. This idea was confirmed by the little 
material that existed concerning the preference of consumers and employees 
to make use of/join an organisation of confessional denomination.
As regards consumers, several other reasons for their making use of a 
certain confessional organisation were mentioned, the specialized functions 
and professional qualifications of a particular institution being among the 
ones most frequently mentioned. As regards the employees of a confessional 
organisation, the ideological motivations seemed to have fallen into the 
background, in favour of emphasis on professional aspirations.
But why did the structural verzuiling continue to dominate in some 
sectors despite a decline in the verzuiling preference, in orthodoxy and 
despite the disappearance of confessional organisations as a consequence of 
rationalizations?
Van Wersch made an interesting suggestion when he stated that the 
decision to abandon the confessional identity was often not so much in the 
hands of the consumers as in those of the governing body of an institution. 
In most cases these were not very willing to give up the religious identity 
of the institution. Both clauses in the regulations stating that members of 
the governing body had to subscribe to the religious fundamentals and 
undemocratic procedures to recruit members to the governing body (many times 
members were appointed, not elected) were features of governing bodies in 
the non profit sector which enabled them to pursue such a policy. Therefore 
demands for further democratization of these institutions would most likely 
bring about a further decline of the structural verzuiling.
But which factors, in case a declining support for confessional 
organisations did exist, explained the underlying tendencies towards 
deconfessionalization and secularization? In the literature two hypotheses, 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, were put forward.
The first focused on the changes within the churches themselves, in 
particular within the Catholic church. This was the so-called internal 
crisis hypothesis.
The second one emphasised changes in the wider social context, 
pointing at the influence of such processes as urbanisation and 
industrialisation on deconfessionalisation and secularization.
In the first hypothesis the movement was supposed to have gone from 
the centre to the edge, in the second case from the edge to the centre, thus 
from the ordinary church members to the clergy. For this reason the latter 
hypothesis was called the erosion hypothesis. Thurlings and Simons both 
supported the first hypothesis.(28) They concentrated their analyses on the 
events within the Catholic church, which was understandable in view of the 
fact that changes were fastest there and that the erosion of the Catholic 
zuil had been the strongest.
The internal crisis hypothesis focused on the changes taking place 
among church leaders at the end of the fifties and the beginning of’ the 
sixties. In the decade between 1955 and 1965 the Catholic church in the 




























































































provinces to one of the most progressive. In 1954 for example the Bishops 
were still forbidding labourers to join socialist labour unions under 
penalty of ex-communication. At the same time however, it was already 
impossible to forbid membership of the Social Democratic party, as this 
would have alienated Catholic intellectuals who formed a seperate Catholic 
working group within the Social Democratic party.
The Bishop's Charge of 1954 marked the end of an era. After this date 
changes followed one after another in quick succesion. In a report of 1957 
the so-called identification debate was opened, that is, a discussion on the 
meaning and necessity of Catholic organisations outside the Catholic church. 
More and more the verzuiling came under attack from within the church 
itself. The Second Vatican Council encouraged discussion on the new 
theology, and the circle of critical theologians and bishops grew.
The debates on the Catholic dogmas, morals and identity soon resulted 
in a sharp opposition of conservative and progressive Catholics, and led 
from 1963 onwards to more and more conflicts between the Dutch church 
province and the Vatican. In 1970 Rome started its counter-offensive with 
the nomination of an extremely conservative bishop in one of the most 
progressive urban dioceses. This policy was continued in the subsequent 
decade, causing the Dutch bishops to formulate their standpoint more 
carefully, and to lose their international pioneering role in the Catholic 
church.
The developments described originated from within the clergy, but 
rapidly found their way to the ordinary church members. In Simons' view the 
catholic zuil, being once used as an effective instrument to pass on the 
traditional norms, values and attitudes, contributed to the spread of new 
ideas, in this way simultaneously contributing to its own liquidation. He 
called this 'the reverse functioning of the zuil': The opposite functioning 
of the same socio-cultural mechanisms in various cultural-historical 
contexts.(29) Growing latitudinarism, doubts about the meaning of the 
Catholic identity, and a reduced acceptance of authoritarian relations all 
added to a crumbling of the Catholic zuil.
Crucial points in this explanation the questions why this sudden 
change of opinion among the church leaders took place, and why at that 
specific moment? How was it possible that a church province which hitherto 
had been one of the most docile suddenly turned into the most rebellious?
For an explanation Thurlings turned his attention to the emancipation 
hypothesis (30). By the beginning of the 1950's the emancipation of the 
Catholics as a previously discriminated group had been completed. Their new 
position enabled them to develop a certain openness, and to commence a 
critical evaluation of the own principles, as they no longer were 
threatened. The internal debate which subsequently developed resulted in a 
crisis, and strong erosion of the Catholic zuil.
Van Heek, sociologist, criticised Thurlings' analysis for omitting 
the context of the changes in the Catholic Church.(31) In his opinion it was 
the contradiction between the rigid attitude of the Catholic Church, for 
example expressed by the Bishop's Charge of 1954, and the development of the 
'permissive society' on the other hand, which made conflict unavoidable. 




























































































opposite movement: the church maintaining its dogmatism in its struggle for 
a majority position, the outside world developing in the direction of 'the 
end of ideology', of less stringent morality and of the abolition of 
authoritarian rule.
The outcome of the sharp conflict between conservatives and 
progressives was a weakening of the position of the conservatives, and a 
consequent erosion of organisational networks.
Van Heek's explanation is not very satisfying if we take the time of 
the two opposite processes into account.
Still, inclusion of external factors in the explanation of the 
declining position of the Catholic Church seems justified. Neither changes 
in the thinking of the church leaders nor the wider societal developments 
would by themself have been able to bring about a weakening of the position 
of the Catholic Church. Moreover erosion of the Catholic organisations 
outside the church did not arise only from changes within the church. 
External factors also influenced the declining support for Catholic 
organisations (erosion-hypothesis). A few of them have already been 
mentioned, such as the necessity to rationalize and expand many welfare 
institutions, the increased geographical mobility, which brought people of 
different groups in greater contact with each other, the spread of mass 
communication means, which confronted people more and more with the opinions 
of different groups than that to which they belonged themselves, 
urbanization, polarization of socio-economic relations etc.
3.4. Verzuiling and ontzuiling of the education system - concluding notes
In the preceding sections on tendencies towards verzuiling and 
ontzuiling we have made only scant reference to the educational system. In 
the next pages, however, we will concentrate on this. Data on the verzuiling 
of the educational system will be presented and possible explanantions of 
the relatively weak ontzuiling within the educational system will be 
discussed. Where available and useful, data will given at provincial level, 
the smallest spatial unit for which comparative research on developments of 
the educational system has been undertaken so far.
Table one of chapter two has shown that during the 19th century the 
number of independent schools had been growing, though only very slowly. By 
1880, when the struggle for equal subsidies reached its peak, a quarter of 
the pupils attended independent schools. This is a considerable share if one 
bears in mind that these schools had to be completely financed by the 
parents. After 1889, when the first coalition cabinet of Catholics and 
Protestants succeeded in passing a law which stated that the local 
governments would, under certain conditions make a contribution to the 




























































































One of the preconditions was that these independent schools would 
then have to be open to children of all religions, and this of course ran 
counter to the ideas behind the struggle for independent schools.
Through subsequent changes of the Education Law partial subsidization 
of independent schools was made possible. In 1905 the subsidization 
possibilities were again considerably improved. The independent sector 
entered a period of rapid growth. Meanwhile in 1900 elementary education had 
been made compulsory. Although at the end of the century a high attendance 
level existed, schooling was certainly not universal. From the growth rate 
of pupils in the first decades of this century it may be concluded that 
compulsory education did have an impact on enrolment.(32)
In 1917 the equal subsidization of public and independent schools was 
laid down by constitutional law. From then onwards the proportionality 
principle would 'rule' the educational system. In the allocation of the 
necessarily scarce financial resources at the governments's disposal the 
rule of proportionality found its most important application. Concerning the 
education system it implied that all schools, independent as well as public, 
would receive government funds in proportion to the number of pupils 
enrolled.
Several authors have pointed to the fact that this rule, while 
solving the politically sensitive problem of allocation of money among the 
ideological blocks, introduced a certain rigidity in policy-making: many 
political issues were transformed into a purely administrative matter, for 
example the decisions about the founding and closure of elementary schools 
(for secondary schools and institutions of higher education the situation 
was somewhat different).(33)
After 1920, when the constitutional changes were elaborated in the 
1920 Educational Law, the independent schools started a take-over manoeuvre, 
pushing the public sector increasingly into the defence. The following 
tables will show how this process took place. They are taken from an article 
by Knippenberg and Van der Wusten whose analysis I will follow.
The most interesting thing to consider is the distribution of pupils 
over the different sectors given the proportions of denominational groups in 
the relevant age groups. In general terms, no Catholic children went to 
Protestant schools and vice versa, whereas both Catholic and Protestant 
children could be found in public elementary schools. Table 9 shows the 
distribution of pupils and the composition of age groups at two crucial 
moments.
In 1920 the revised Educational Law had just been passed. The year 
1970 marked the beginning of a new era because at that date the sharp 
decline of the birth-rate, which started in 1964, was going to be felt in 
the primary education system. With the decline in the number of children of 
school going age, a second wave of competition for pupils between schools of 
different denominations began. However, apart from the demographic factor 
there were other factors putting the system under strain. The ontzuiling 
tendencies contributed to this as well. The effects of both processes only 




























































































The overall evolution is clear from table 9. The share of the public 
elementary schools had been almost halved in the 1920-1970 period while the 
share of the Catholic sector had practically doubled and the share of the 
Protestant sector had been considerably increased, in 1970 being equal to 
the share of the public sector. At the same time the proportion of children 
from families without religious affiliation had increased at about the same 
rate. This was the result of ongoing secularization, which raised the 
percentage of the secular section of the population from 5.0 in 1909 to 23.6 
in 1971.(34)
Table 9 can be interpreted as follows. When financial equality was 
established most pupils were enrolled in public elementary schools, but the 
independent sector at that stage already made up a sizeable part of the 
schools.
By 1920 nearly all Orthodox Calvinist families were sending their 
children to their own independent schools. The Catholic population too had 
started to build up its school system, but by 1920 only just over half of 
the Catholic school children were attending this type of schools. Such a 
small proportion is not surprising if one bears in mind that in the 
southern, homogeneously Catholic provinces, many public schools were de 
facto Catholic, lessening the need for independent Catholic schools.
In the same year a minority, probably not more than a third, of the 
Dutch Reformed children went to independentf7schools, the rest being educated 
in public schools where they formed about 50% of the pupils. Half a century 
later the public sector had further declined because all Catholic children 
went to their own schools and also because the Protestant sector had 
increased its share, primarily by attracting a larger part of the Dutch 
Reformed children. Thus, contrary to what we have found in the preceding 
section on verzuiling in other social sectors, in the education system, the 
Dutch Reformed population belonged almost entirely to the Protestant zuil.
The public elementary schools were now far more homogeneous, the 
majority of the children coming from families without religious affiliation.
In the next table Knippenberg and Van der Wusten gave the changes per 
province in the proportionate shares of the different sectors for the years 
preceding 1920 and the 1920-1928 period.
The years before 1920 showed a strong national trend in the decrease 
of the share of pupils in the public sector. The Protestant and Catholic 
sectors were on the increase in most provinces. These processes displayed 
regional variations, but not as strong as in the subsequent period. In the 
years 1920-1928 both the decline of the public sector as well as the growth 
of the Protestant and Catholic sectors accelerated. Moreover these 
developments showed a much stronger regional variation. The decrease of the 
public sector share was particularly large in two eastern provinces 
(Overijssel, Gelderland) and the three southern ones (Zeeland, North 
Brabant, Limburg). In four of these this was due to the growth of the 
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Finally in table 11 regression equations for 1920 and 1970 are given 
for three educational sectors, with the denominational distribution as 
independent variable. The analysis takes into account the 11 provinces.
In 1920 the share per province of the pupils in the public sector 
could be explained for roughly 60% by the number of children of school going 
age from families without religious affilliation or with a Dutch Reformed 
background. In the province of Utrecht the public sector had lost far more 
than its share, whereas two of the more peripheral provinces had gained in 
1920 far more than their expected share of pupils in the public elementary 
school. These relatively strong positive and negative deviations have been 
caused by regional differences in the mobilization of the Catholic and 
Protestant population sectors for the purpose of establishing their own 
schools. The Protestant sector was relatively well predicted by the 
proportion of Orthodox Calvinist children, the Catholic sector was even 
better indicated by the proportion of Catholic children. As a complement to 
the extreme decrease of the public sector share in the province of Utrecht, 
both the Protestant and the Catholic sector were overrepresented here in 
1920 compared to their predicted values and it was the outlying provinces of 
Groningen and Limburg that were underrepresented here. North Brabant showed 
a high positive residual, a trend already established in the sixties. This 
trend was largely explained by the fact that girls in particular attended 




























































































Table eleven. Regressions of age groups on pupil shares per province for 
1920 and 1970 (37)
Public sector 
1920
x = no religion + Dutch 
y = 0.4 x + 36.65 
largest residuals:
Reformed
r = 0.773 
+ Limburg, Drente 
- Utrecht
1970 y = 0.82x - 7.59 
largest residuals





x = Orthodox protestant 
y = 1.41 x + 7.36 
largest residuals:
r = 0.874
+ Utrecht, Gelderland 
- Groningen, Limburg
1970 y = 1.95x + 13.16 
largest residuals
r = 0.811
+ Utrecht, Gelderland, 
South Holland 
- North Brabant, Limburg
Catholic
1920
x = Catholic 
y = 0.6x - 0.42 
largest residuals:
r = 0.975
+ North Brabant, Utrecht, 
North Holland 
- Limburg
1970 y = l.Olx - 2.3 
largest residual:
r = 0.991 
+ Overijssel
The picture arising from the tables 10 and 11 does not immediately
confirm Daalder's hypothesis on regional variations in the beginning of the 
verzuiling. (38) His idea was that in areas of a mainly latitudinarian and 
increasingly secular orientation (parts of Friesland, Groningen, Drenthre 
and North Holland, a few areas in Gelderland and Overijssel) and in areas of 
a mixed religious character (predominatly in the West, but also in Utrecht, 
Gelderland and parts of Friesland) the verzuiling took place at an earlier 
date than in other regions.
For the educational sector this seems true as far as the provinces of 
Utrecht, Gelderland, North Holland and North Brabant are concerned ( these 




























































































Calvinist and Catholic pupils). The other regions mentioned in the 
hypothesis did not deviate substantially from the national trend.
Knippenberg and Van der Wusten argued that a centre-periphery 
dimension could be of use for the interpretation of the regional pattern of 
progress in the independent sector and the complementary retreat of the 
public sector. The idea was that those in favour of the independent schools 
were first heard in the more central part of the country as a consequence of 
propagandist strategies or on account of the fact that these regions would 
more easily be reached by mobilization efforts from a national centre.
Both ideas however, need further examination. Firstly it is necessary 
to analyse the quantitative developments in both sectors of the school 
system of this period for smaller spatial units to be able to distinguish 
trends for different regions within provinces, since provincial data 
apparently give too general a picture. Secondly the hypothetical 
régionalisation put forward by Daalder needs refinement if it is to be 
matched with the results of the first analysis. Thirdly it has to be 
examined whether national organisations, supposedly having their 
headquarters in the centre provinces, supported local initiatives to 
establish schools.
In 1970 the public elementary school had considerably declined in 
importance but the proportion of non religious and Dutch Reformed people in 
the population predicted the share of the public sector far better than in 
1920. Moreover the public elementary school had become the domain of a much 
more uniform population as regards its ideological background. Prediction of 
the Protestant sector by the Orthodox Calvinist age group had somewhat 
decreased, apparently because this sector attracted pupils from other small 
(Orthodox) Protestant population sectors. Prediction of the Catholic sector 
share by the Catholic children of school going age was still very strong.
Both sectors, the Protestant and the Catholic one, were able to 
maintain their share until the 1970's. Relevant declines in the size of 
these denominational groups due to secularization did not take place. On the 
contrary, the Catholic population group increased by some 5.0 points between 
1920 and 1970 because of demographic factors.(39)
Other factors, such as changes in settlement patterns, segmental 
mobilization and depillarization did not erode the share of the Catholic and 
Protestant sectors either. Secularization only brought about changes within 
the group attending the public school, consequently it did not affect the 
distribution over the three sectors.
Unfortunately Knippenberg and Van der Wusten were unable to include 
the 1970-1980 period in their analysis, This was mainly due to the fact that 
no census has been held since 1971, hence the distribution of the population 
(and the different age groups within the population) over the various 
denominations was not known.
However, the general impression given in the literature was that the 
school system was the last bastion of the verzuiling. Even if the zuilen 
were being eroded on all sides from the mid 1960's onwards, in the school 
system this was only notable in the course of the 1970-1980 decade, and even 




























































































growth in these years, the Catholic sector lost 5%.(40) The Protestant zuil, 
where the ontzuiling started later and developed much slower, has been able 
to maintain its position up to now.
Van Wersch gave some figures (not for pupils but for schools) which 
illustrate this.
Table twelve. Share of elementary schools according to sector, 1957 and
1977 (41)
confessional non confessional
cath. prot. total public independent total
1957 36.4 28.9 65.3 32.7 2.0 34.7
1977 32.3 31.1 63.4 34.2 2.4 36.6
In the first instance an explanation for this deviating pattern 
(compared to other social sectors) seems to be found in Thurling's idea that 
the ontzuiling had (just as the verzuiling process in the past) a 
differential character, that is, some sectors would experience an 
ontzuiling-process at an earlier stage than others, depending on the 
importance of their function in keeping the system stable. Just as the 
education system was one of the first sectors where organisation along 
religious dividing lines took place, because of its importance in the 
transmissione of values, it was the last sector to be influenced by the 
ontzuiling trend. The education sector was apparently the only sector where 
the organisational verzuiling still had a certain logic. But when we 
examined the difference between the real organisational verzuiling and the 
verzuiling preference, relevant discrepancies came to the fore. A few 
studies have demonstrated that, in comparison with other sectors, the 
verzuiling preference was strongest with regard to (elementary education) 
but that signs of a decline existed even in this sector. Although many 
parents belonging to a church still show a strong preference for 
denominational schools as shown in table 13,this percentage had decreased by 
15 points in the 1966-1975 period. The greatest change occurred between 1966 
and 1977, a period of many rapid changes in Dutch society (see for example 
the changes in the party system, section 3.3)
Table thirteen. Opinion of those belonging to a denomination, on the 
relation between religion and enrolment of one's children in a specific 
type of elementary school(42)
1966 1977 1975
public school 17.2 14.7 14.8
confessional school 76.1 60.4 61
does not matter 5.3 24.1 21 .8
don11 know 1.1 0.9 2.4




























































































Hence around 1970 there was a considerable difference between the 
actual verzuiling behaviour of parents belonging to a church (nearly all of 
them sent their children to denominational schools) and their verzuiling 
preference. This implied that major changes in the direction of ontzuiling 
of the elementary school system are most likely still to come. These changes 
however, if they are to occur, will not be the same for the different 
denominations. Research among Catholic and Protestant parents has pointed to 
substantial differences of preferences: catholic parents tending much more 
to prefer public or interconfessional schools for their children, while 
among the protestant group the verzuiling preference is still rather strong.
What could possibly be the reasons for the persistence of the 
organisational verzuiling in the education sector? In the preceding section 
we mentioned a few of the factors contributing to the maintenance of the 
organisational verzuiling which might also have applied to the school 
system.
Firstly there was the fact that the elementary school provided the 
most important instrument for an institutionalized religious socialisation, 
apart from the churches themselves. The figures given in table 13 showed a 
decreasing verzuiling preference but they should be interpreted with 
caution. Research has proved that some parents who expressed the wish not to 
send their children to a school of Catholic identity still did so because 
they valued religious education in general. For lack of an alternative 
school of non-exclusive Catholic character, for example an ecumenical 
school, they opted for a Catholic or Protestant school.(43)
But it was not only the parents who valued this religious socialising 
aspect, the churches too continued to show their interest in denominational 
education. Even in 1977 the Dutch Bishops expressed in an open letter their 
wish to maintain catholic schools. Hence the strong organisational 
verzuiling in the education system may have resulted from tendencies which 
made the denominational school still acceptable.
A second factor was that, unlike some other non profit sectors, in 
the education system, at least at elementary school level, it has not been 
necessary to expand units. In the secondary school system however, 
diversification of the curriculum has made larger units necessary, and 
consequently many schools had to merge. In some cases this brought along 
with it an abandonment of the specifically Catholic or Protestant character 
of the school.
Another point was that an elementary school provided a service with a 
very low threshold-value, which could always be met in a period of 
demographic expansion. Hence there was no need for mergers which might 
endanger their identity. However, since the decline in the birth-rate 
reached the elementary school system the situation changed. This occurred 
particularly in rural areas. Because of a shortage of pupils more and more 
schools had either to close down or to merge with another school nearby. 
This trend caused considerable changes in the share of the different 
sectors.
Thirdly it was possible that in this period many schools were 




























































































In this case neither the teaching personel nor the parents attached too much 
value to the denominational character of the school.
Van Wersch noticed this phenomenon in other areas of the non profit 
sector, but in these government policy concerning subsidies to private 
organisations too, played a role. Private organisations were obliged to 
offer their services to everyone regardless of denominational preference if 
they wanted to be considered for state-aid. This rule did not apply to the 
educational system. Schoolboards of independent schools had the right to 
refuse pupils on the ground of this ideological/religious orientation. But 
with a shrinking market it was not very likely that schools would restrict 
their potential 'clientele'. On the contrary, just like many other non 
profit institutions, they had to try in every possible way to attract 
consumers, in order to survive. In particular in the bigger cities this led 
to the denominational side of a school sometimes being deliberately pushed 
into the background to attract more children of moslem migrant workers.
Fourthly the power of the school boards needs mention. As Van Wersch 
noticed, the decision to maintain or abandon the religious identity of a 
school was often in the hands of the members of these boards. These members 
did not easily give up the religious identity of the school, if only, 
for procedural reasons, they did not belong to the most progressive part of 
those concerned with the school.(44) There are good reasons to assume that 
the verzuiling preference was much stronger among members of schoolboards 
than among parents. The strong position of the denominational education 
sector will at least be partly defined by the power politics of the 
schoolboards and their peak-organisations.
Concluding notes
Verzuiling of the education system is still very strong, stronger than in 
any other sector of society. That Catholic and Protestant parents are very 
much attached to their own schools is not surprising, since a large part of 
socialisation takes place in the formal education system. Despite the fact 
that nearly all these parents send their children to schools of their 
denomination, we have noticed some signs of a possible future reversal of 
the structural verzuiling in the education system.
Most significant in this respect was a survey undertaken by the 
Social Cultural Planning Agency (45) demonstrating that since 1966 the share 
of the denominational education for their children to public education, 
declined considerably.
Hence when we consider the structural verzuiling and the verzuiling 
preference at the same time, we get contradictory impressions.
One of the explanations given in the literature (46) for these 
divergent trends is that the survey of the Social and Cultural Planning 
Agency gave evidence of verbal attitudes only, and that it was not certain, 
that those parents saying that they did not attach to much importance to 
confessional education would actually send their children to a public school 




























































































This line of reasoning would imply that the interest catholic and 
Protestant parents have in denominational education is still high, despite 
the figures on the verzuiling preference. More probably however, is that we 
have to interprete the results of this survey as a declining interest in 
denominational education.
Other parts of the literature (47) suggest that the high structural 
verzuiling of the school system does not result so much from a still high 
collective demand by the parents for denominational education as well from 
the continuous action on the side of the schoolboards of independent 
schools, confessional education interest organisations and Catholic and 
Protestant policy makers to keep the situation as it is, opposing trends 
towards secularization and deconfessionalisation that account for the 
declining support for denominational schools.
Both on local and national government levels these agents have connections 
with politicians and administrators belonging to the confessional parties, 
who support them in this attempt. It seems that the school controversy in 
the Netherlands is largely a struggle to maintain existing positions of 
power and to maintain the status quo between independent and public 
education.
The question can then be raised whether the defense of independent schools 
is undertaken from fear of erosion of denominational education or whether 
the juridical form of independent schools is at stake (48). Clearly, the 
juridical base of independent schools puts the schoolboards in a powerful 
position as compared with those directly involved in the school, the parents 
the teachers, and the head of the school. Schoolboards of independent 
schools are able to refuse any potential members who are not strictly in 
favour of denominational education and independent education in general. 
They are also in the position to define to what extent teachers and parents 
are allowed to participate in formulating the day-to-day and long-term 
policies of the school (49).
Some of the evidence supporting this argument can be found in the 
fact that schoolboards of independent schools often try to enroll as many 
children as possible, regardless of their religious affiliation. In 
particular, in the older quarters of the large towns, inhabitated by many 
migrant workers from Marocco and Turkey and immigrants from Suriname, the 
religious orientation of the school is often suppressed, so as not to scare 
away these potential pupils. This is not to say that for those having 
positions of control in the independent sector, the religious identity of 
the school does not matter, only that other motives also play a role in the 
defence of the independent school.
In the introduction of this paper the issue was raised of the 
different ways in which concern about independent/private education is 
expressed in France and the Netherlands. It is clear that with regard to the 
Netherlands we can not simply say that a decline in the verzuiling 
preference, thus in the interest in private education, among parents is the 
reason that they do not belong to those most involved in the politics around 




























































































On the contrary, analysis of the historical development towards 
freedom of education, of the central position of denominational education in 
the overall structure of verzuiling and the little extent to which it is 
affected by ontzuiling processes, make clear that the existence of 
independent education is not questioned by any group in Dutch society. This 
might very well explain why the debate on the school system arouses much 
less emotions among the public (both those in favour of independent 
education and those in favour of public education) than it does in France. 
Parents do in some cases resist closure of independent schools whenever it 
is a school attended by their own children, but rarerly this protest arises 
from the situation that it is no longer possible to provide them with 
independent education.
Other situations in which mobilisation of parents does take place are found 
in the southern, until recently overwhelmingly Catholic, provinces. Here the 
share of secular and Protestant (due to geographical mobility) population is 
growing and these inhabitants exert an increasing strong demand for own 
public and Protestant schools. Particularly when it concerns public schools 
parents do not seldornly face a sharp political conflict, often stretching 
out over a considerable number of years against the Catholic dominated 
municipal administrations.
The new schoolstruggle, resulting from growing secularization and 
demographic changes, does not give rise to mass mobilization because the 
right to independent/private education (and to the material preconditions 
for private education to exist) is deeply rooted in Dutch society since the 
beginning of this century. In general we can concluded that whereas 'la 
guerre scolaire' in France is a struggle waged by the consumers of 
education, 'de stille schoolstrijd' (50) in the Netherlands is mainly a 
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Anti Revolutionaire Partij (Orthodox Calvinists)
Christen Democratisch Appel (merger of former ARP, CHU 
and KVP, founded in 1977)
Christelijk Historische Unie (Orthodox Dutch Reformed) 
Eenheids Vak Centrale (communist oriented labour union 
federation existing just after W.O.II.)
Gereforineerd Politiek Verbond (Orthodox Calvinists) 
Katholieke Nationale Partij (Catholics)
Katholieke Volks Partij (Catholics)
Partij van de Arbeid (Social Democrats, after W.O. II.) 
Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij (Social Democrats 
before W.O.II.)
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Orthodox Calvinists) 
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